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Abstract
Computers may control safety-critical operations in machines having embedded software. This memoir pro-
poses a regimen to verify such algorithms at prescribed levels of statistical confidence.
The United States Department of Defense standard for system safety engineering (MIL-STD-882E) defines
development procedures for safety-critical systems. However, a problem exists: the Standard fails to dis-
tinguish quantitative product assurance technique from categorical process assurance method for software
development. Resulting is conflict in the technical definition of the term risk.
The primary goal here is to show that a quantitative risk-based product assurance method exists and is con-
sistent with hardware practice. Discussion appears in two major parts: theory, which shows the relationship
between automata and software; and application, which covers demonstration and indemnification. Demon-
stration is a technique for generating random tests; indemnification converts pass/fail test results to compound
Poisson parameters (severity and intensity). Together, demonstration and indemnification yield statistical
confidence that safety-critical code meets design intent. Statistical confidence is the keystone of quantitative
product assurance.
A secondary goal is resolving the conflict over the term risk. The first meaning is an accident model known
in mathematics as the compound Poisson stochastic process, and so is called statistical risk. Various of its
versions underlie the theories of safety and reliability. The second is called developmental risk. It considers
software autonomy, which considers time until manual recovery of control. Once these meanings are sep-
arated, MIL-STD-882 can properly support either formal quantitative safety assurance or empirical process
robustness, which differ in impact.
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Chapter 1
Prologue
1.1 About this memoir
1.1.1 Copyright
This document may be freely copied or modified in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution
license1.
1.1.2 Preface to the fourth revision
This fourth revision was to improve the document’s exposition as applied mathematics. This goal has met
limited success; it is challenged by the author’s meager education and his failing health.
The author deeply regrets that his health now dictates that he is unable to complete this revision. Conse-
quently, this incomplete edition is classified as a memoir. He bids farewell to this portrayal of reactive sys-
tems, and wishes all interested parties well in continued advancement. His fondest wish is that this memoir
will prove useful to researchers.
.
1.1.3 Acknowledgment
The author acknowledges W. Ross Ashby and his 1956 pioneering work in cybernetics[1]. His depiction of
the transducer [The Determinate Machine and The Machine With Input, Chapters 3 and 4] was the author’s
personal inspiration for the reactive (semi-deterministic) actuated automaton. Here this topic is covered in
chapter 7.
1http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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1.1.4 Credentials
The author holds an undergraduate degree in mathematics from the University of Minnesota. He is a retired
safety and reliability engineer with more than three decades of software experience.
1.1.5 Advocacy
The author is a critic ofMIL-STD-882, the United States Department of Defense standard for systems safety. A
fault occurring in the Standard is absence of quantitative assurance for software. He objects to the prescribed
software safety metrics, which result in incomparable measures of risk between software and hardware haz-
ards. The author’s credentials mark this memoir as experienced but non-scholarly advocacy.
1.1.6 Approach
This memoir collects related career experiences of the author into a mathematical discussion.
A custom automaton lays a foundation for software quantitative assurance. It accomplishes this by examining
the significance of a random sample of bounded software trajectories passing through a common point. Such
a collection, when tested, is here called a safety demonstration. No error is tolerated in a safety demonstration.
Indemnification converts the test result to Poisson probability, which is consistent with hardware practice.
The test result is expressed as statistical confidence.
1.2 Management summary
United States MIL-STD-882E, a widely recognized system safety standard, mistakenly prescribes two incom-
patible safety analysis methodologies, one for hardware and the other for software. The safety method for
software was formulated by focusing on the “shift-left”[16] debugging strategy of development engineers.
When this partial but incomplete strategy is imposed on safety engineers, quantitative assurance of software
safety is lost. The present Standard ignores an important objective of system safety engineering: providing a
QUANTITATIVE level of assured safety, having common measure between hardware and software. Indeed this
error is so fundamental that one must question whether systems safety was properly represented during this
standard’s review. Properly managed, the system safety discipline requires common philosophy and measure
of safety in order to understand and rank heterogeneous hazards.
MIL-STD-882 indisputably does not provide a common measure of safety assurance. The present Standard is
not wrong as it stands for development engineers. However, the Standard fails one of the leading expectations
of safety engineering, namely to express the risks of hazards in common units. Thus MIL-STD-882 suffers
a fundamental error which renders it unacceptably wrong. The prescribed safety methods for hardware and
software diverge in both metrics and ideology. Harm ensues because modern engineered systems are usu-
ally neither pure hardware nor pure software; thus they require common measure to render hazard threats
comparable.
Development engineers characteristically have superior knowledge of project detail, whereas safety engineers
appreciate the quantitative risks underlying hazard identification and analysis. Hazard analysis is a separate
engineering topic.2
2A comprehensive work on the subject is Engineering a Safer World[4] by Leveson
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The overall process is improved by fine-tuning the duties of these personnel to their particular abilities: de-
velopment and debugging for software engineers and quantitative assurance for safety engineers. Currently
MIL-STD-882 does not differentiate the duties of these two personnel groups, but recommends a team ap-
proach with oversight responsibility for safety engineers.
Bug discovery is a necessary prelude to assurance, which is not direct verification of logic itself, but verifi-
cation of a random sample of software trajectories representing the logic under examination. This approach
is necessary because gross logic is assembled from smaller combinatory pieces, and whether these pieces
are always equivalent to the whole must be quantitatively assured. This is also the reason that assurance is a
statistical task with levels of confidence depending on sample size.
The author recognizes shift-left tactics as important to efficient development; no change to process for de-
velopment engineers is proposed here. However, we do wish to add software assurance procedure for safety
engineers. In this sense, assured is not merely synonymouswith feeling good about the development process.
Assurance tests are specially structured to affirm safety at known statistical confidence levels. These proce-
dures are plainly missing fromMIL-STD-882; it should be amended to include metrics supporting quantitative
assurance of safety hazards.
1.3 Apologies to the reader
The author apologizes that the concepts discussed here, being distilled from his personal experience, are new
to him but not to all.
This memoir falls short of academic standards of quality; it benefits from neither literature search nor peer
review. The experienced reader may find terms in nonstandard context. The author has strived to maintain
consistency, but admits deficiency in standardization of nomenclature, a consequence of writing in isolation.
The author apologizes for resulting inconvenience.
There are worthy readers who would prefer a traditional engineering approach (examples) to this topic; how-
ever mathematics is central in what follows. A mathematical foundation is necessary, and this memoir is
a step in that direction. The author was emphatically not a mathematician; his education is over-matched
even to begin this work. The author encourages interested academically qualified individuals to advance this
memoir into proper research.
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Chapter 2
Rudiments of discrete reactive systems
This chapter discusses core structures of discrete systems theory. Definitions of very basic concepts such as
ensemble, class, and their elementary operations appear in Groundwork, Appendix A.1 ff.
2.1 Description of discrete systems
The operation of discrete systems is composed of chains woven from paired units of stimulus and response.
Each stimulus appears in either of two types, deterministic or stochastic, and possesses a value. Deterministic
stimuli are computable and retain their values until re-assigned, a feature that is enabled by buffered storage.
Stochastic stimuli are volatile, requiring observation rather than computation, and their value is defined only
at the instant of observation. This value may be copied to deterministic storage. Example stochastic stimuli
are inputs from sensors and remote commands to robotic apparatus. Systems containing both stimulus types
are called reactive.
For any combination of stimuli, discrete reactive systems construct a unique response. The agent transform-
ing stimuli into response is called a functionality. Since responses are computable, they are recorded in
deterministic storage. Therefore, as a mapping, a functionality has domain consisting of deterministic and
stochastic stimuli, and codomain similarly composed of deterministic storage.
In its characteristic chain of stimulus and response, successive links are called frames. Each frame is com-
posed of a stimulus (starting condition) and a response (ending condition). Frames are not independent
because of a mechanism called feedback. Feedback expresses the principle that the current frame’s response
is included in the next frame’s stimulus
As a non-reactive example consider a clock having pendulum, cog-wheels and escapement. At each tick,
accomplished gear train movement becomes input to the next. The ending condition generated in the current
frame feeds forward into the starting condition of the next frame.
Axiom 2.1.1 (deterministic stimulus). Class Φ̂ represents deterministic stimulus, the value of which persists
between assignments.
Axiom 2.1.2 (stochastic stimulus). Class Ξ̂ represents stochastic stimulus, the value of which is instantaneous
and not predictable free of error. A stochastic stimulus is “read-only”, used but set outside the system.
Axiom 2.1.3 (response). Class Φ̂ contains the system’s unique response to the reactive stimulus.
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Axiom 2.1.4 (reactive). A stimulus and response is “reactive” if it is a mapping from the union of determin-
istic and stochastic space into deterministic space, symbolically Φ̂Ξ̂→ Φ̂ (see §A.4.2).
Definition 2.1.5 (reactive). A stimulus and response is “reactive” if it is a mapping from the union of deter-
ministic and stochastic space into deterministic space, symbolically Φ̂Ξ̂→ Φ̂ (see §A.4.2).
Definition 2.1.6 (reactive basis). Two classes Φ̂ and Ξ̂ are a reactive basis, designated Φ̂ × Ξ̂, if there is a
mapping between stimulus and response Φ̂Ξ̂→ Φ̂, and if this mapping is disjoint (domΦ ∩ domΞ = ∅).
2.2 Principles of stochastic stimulus
Reactive stimulus in systems is a composite of the two stimulus types, deterministic and stochastic. Stochastic
stimulus is required to complete the value of reactive stimulus. In mathematics stochastic stimuli are values
which are not defined until used. In accordance with the aforementioned physics interpretation, we require a
sequence of stochastic stimuli to be read in sequential order, at the instant corresponding to that order.
Notation 2.2.1. The pseudo-function ξ = stochastic (Ξ̂) means that ξ is a random sample of population Ξ̂.
Remark. Distributions, moments, and autocorrelations may be important in real problems, but will not be
used here. Randomness does not deny these properties.
2.2.1 Cybernetics
We routinely picture time as a continuum of instants. In this framework, each event of discrete systems theory
occupies an instant and occurs in a duration (interval). Bounded collections of events possess either a time
or a starting and ending time. In discrete processes frames constitute a partition of time. Frames adjacent in
time are connected.
Axiom 2.2.2. Before observation, a stochastic stimulus is non-existent as a realized value.
Remark. Before the current cycle (definition 7.1.1), the current stochastic stimulus is an object of probabilistic
uncertainty (a random variable). In the current cycle it transitions into a realized observation.
The automaton resembles an automorphism, except certain of its arguments are unknown until their instant
of use. In physics stochastic stimulus is not computable, and the only way to determine its exact value is
through observation.
Deterministic stimulus has the contrasting property that once its value is set, it retains that value until re-set.
This is the paradigm associated with ordinary computer memory transactions.
2.3 Frame space
The frame is a two-part structure consisting of starting and ending conditions. Interpreted in systems vocab-
ulary, a frame’s starting condition is a stimulus and its ending condition is a response.
Definition 2.3.1. The frame space F of reactive basis Φ̂× Ξ̂ is the set Φ̂Ξ̂× Φ̂. A member f ∈ F is a frame.
Nomenclature. Let f = (φξ, ϕ) ∈ Φ̂Ξ̂× Φ̂ be a frame. The choice φξ ∈ Φ̂Ξ̂ is the frame’s starting condition
(abscissa) and ϕ ∈ Φ̂ is the frame’s ending condition (ordinate).
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Definition 2.3.2. Let Φ̂ × Ξ̂ be a basis with frame space F = Φ̂Ξ̂ × Φ̂. Define the abscissa projection
absc : F→ Φ̂Ξ̂ by (φξ, ϕ)
absc
7→ φξ. Define the ordinate projection ord : F→ Φ̂ by (φξ, ϕ)
ord
7→ ϕ.
Definition 2.3.3. Let Φ̂×Ξ̂ be a basis with deterministic-stochastic partitionΨ = ΦΞ (see §A.4.2). Suppose f
is a frame in Φ̂Ξ̂×Φ̂. The reactive stimulus of frame f is ψ = φξ = absc f . The stochastic excitation stimulus
of frame f is ξ = (absc f)↾domΞ . Similarly, the deterministic stimulus of frame f is φ = (absc f)↾domΦ .
Nomenclature. In the above, both φ and ϕ are members of Φ̂. Interpretation of the choice space Φ̂ is contex-
tual. It is a component of stimulus in context of a frame’s starting condition, and is the system’s response in
the context of a frame’s ending condition.
2.4 Feedback
Two frames may be related such that the ending condition of the first frame is replicated as a subset of
the second frame’s starting condition. This stipulation is called feedback; it’s conveniently expressed as a
mapping restriction.
Axiom 2.4.1. Feedback is the principle that the current frame’s response becomes the next frame’s determin-
istic stimulus.
Remark. For consecutive frames f and f ′, this condition is written ord f = (absc f ′)↾domΦ .
Definition 2.4.2 (feedback-coupled frames). Let Φ̂ × Ξ̂ be a reactive basis with frames f and f ′ in frame
space F = Φ̂Ξ̂× Φ̂. Frame f is (directionally) feedback-coupled to f ′ if ord f = (absc f ′)↾domΦ .
Remark. Suppose the current frame is (φξ, ϕ) and the next frame is (φ′ξ′, ϕ′). The feedback equality φ′ = ϕ
is intrinsic to discrete reactive systems.
Definition 2.4.3 (coupling for sequences of frames). Let Φ̂ × Ξ̂ be a reactive basis with sequence of frames
{fn} : N→ Φ̂Ξ̂× Φ̂. The sequence is coupled by feedback if fi is coupled to fi+1 for each i ≥ 1.
Definition 2.4.4 (process). With Φ̂× Ξ̂ a reactive basis, a process is a feedback-coupled sequence of frames
N→ Φ̂Ξ̂× Φ̂.
2.5 Functionality
The functionality is useful to portray the frame as a transformation from the reactive stimulus to the response
space, which is identical to the deterministic space.
The functionality determines how the frame goes from reactive stimulus to response. If fi = (ψi, ϕi) =
(φiξi, ϕi) is the i
th process frame, this concept permits writing ϕi = f (ψi) = f (φiξi), where f is a function-
ality:
Definition 2.5.1. Let Φ̂ × Ξ̂ be a reactive basis. Any mapping f : Φ̂Ξ̂ → Φ̂ is a functionality (that is, if
f ∈ Φ̂Φ̂Ξ̂).
Remark (functionality versus function). In its programming sense, the term “function” will not be used here.
A mathematical functionality differs from a software function; functionalities take a global approach to the
function’s argument list. By virtue of its ordered argument list, a programming function is effectively a class
of functionalities.
Definition 2.5.2 (procedure). Let F ⊆ Φ̂Φ̂Ξ̂ be a finite collection of functionalities. A procedure is a
sequence {fn} : N→ F .
6
2.6 Consistency of frames and functionalities
The relation holding between frame f ∈ Φ̂Ξ̂× Φ̂ and functionality f : Φ̂Ξ̂→ Φ̂ is membership: either f ∈ f
or f /∈ f .
Definition 2.6.1. Let f be a frame and f be a functionality. The frame and the functionality are consistent if
f ∈ f (that is, f = (ψ, ϕ) = (ψ, f (ψ))).
Notation 2.6.2 (anonymous sequence). A sequence in a set S is some mapping σ : N → S – that is, σ ∈
SN. The anonymous sequence convention allows reference to a sequence using the compound symbol {sn},
understanding s ∈ S. The symbol si denotes that term (i, si) ∈ {sn}.
Remark. The convention is clumsy when expressing functional notation; for instance si = {sn}(i) means
i
{sn}
7→ si.
Definition 2.6.3. Let {fn} be a sequence of frames and {fn} be a sequence of functionalities. The sequences
of frames and functionalities are consistent if fi ∈ fi for each i ≥ 1 (that is, fi = (ψi, ϕi) = (ψi, fi(ψi))).
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Chapter 3
Discrete categorical regulation
Regulatory structures for the reactive actuated automaton are partitions, actuators, and related transducers.
The domain sponsoring regulation is reactive space. Transducer labels have a subordinate role.
3.1 Lookup tables
A lookup table T is a finite computer science structure of paired indices and values. It is secondarily known
as an associative array, and denoted that (i, v) ∈ T or v = T (i). As the notation indicates, the relation
between indices and values must be a mapping.
Lookup tables are alternatively organized via their indices’ level sets. Let ℓ be a level set of indices, so
ℓ = {i1, i2, ...ik}. In canonical compound form, a lookup table has the property (ℓ, v) ∈ T and (ℓ
′, v) ∈ T
implies ℓ = ℓ′.
Lookup tables are easily implemented in most programming languages.
3.1.1 Classification of lookup tables
We identify two basic types of lookup table which are equivalent but differ in set-theoretic structure. The
direct-indexed form is a transducer and the level-set type is an actuator.
3.2 Partitions
In the context of a partition, the level set of §3.1 is known as a block.
Definition 3.2.1 (block). A block of a collectionX is a non-empty subset B, such that B 6= ∅ and B ⊆ X .
Definition 3.2.2 (finite partition). A finite partition of a collectionX , denoted#(X), is a finite set of blocks
Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that each Bi 6= ∅, Bi ∩Bj = ∅ if i 6= j, andX =
⋃
Bi.
We have defined# as a single instance of a partition, rather than the set of all partitions.
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Definition 3.2.3 (rho function). Let X be a set with partition #(X). Suppose B ∈ #(X) is a block and
χ ∈ X is a member. The rho function is ̺B(χ) =
{
B if χ ∈ B
∅ if χ /∈ B
.
3.2.1 The containing block function and families of partitions
The containing block function converts a point of reactive space into its containing partition block.
Definition 3.2.4 (containing block of a partition). Suppose χ ∈ X is a member of set X , #(X) is a par-
tition of X , and B ∈ #(X) is a block of the partition. The containing block mapping ⊞, is defined as
{(χ,Bχ) : χ ∈ X and Bχ =
⋃
B∈#(X) ̺B(χ)} (see definition 3.2.3 for rho function).
Remark. The containing block function has prototype⊞ : X → #(X).
The abstract set X is now realized as Ψ̂, the space of reactive stimuli. Suppose we have a finite collection
P of finite partitions of reactive space (that is, for each p ∈ P , p = #(Ψ̂) for some partition #(Ψ̂)). This
mapping is symbolized ⊞, and it is associated with some implicitly understood partition #(Ψ̂). The notion
of a solitary containing block may be extended into a family of mappings indexed by p ∈ P .
Notation 3.2.5. Let P be a collection of partitions of reactive space. For each p ∈ P , the corresponding
containing block function is denoted⊞p.
3.3 Actuators
In software engineering,we take the actuator as a uniform comb-structured conditional statement: if condition1
then consequence1, elsif condition2 then consequence2, . . . else consequencen. Each condition is a set of
reactive stimuli, and the consequences are homogeneous and possibly compound-valued.
Definition 3.3.1 (actuator). An actuator is a mapping a : #(Ψ̂)→ N from the blocks of a finite partition of
reactive space to an abstract space N .
Remark. The actuator of definition 3.3.1 has the form {B1 7→ ν1, · · · , Bn 7→ νn}, where each block
Bi ∈ #(Ψ̂) and νi ∈ N .
Definition 3.3.2 (canonical form). An actuator a : #(Ψ̂) → N is in canonical form if (B, ν) ∈ a and
(B′, ν) ∈ a implies B = B′ for any ν ∈ N .
Lemma 3.3.3. Any actuator a has domain dom a, which is itself a partition of the form #(Ψ̂).
Proof. Definition 3.3.1 states that any actuator a is a mapping#(Ψ̂)→ N . By equivocation, dom a = #(Ψ̂)
is a partition of Ψ̂.
3.4 Transducers
Lemma 3.4.1 (re-indexed actuator). Suppose a : #(Ψ̂)→ N is an actuator per definition 3.3.1, and⊞dom a : Φ̂→
#(Φ̂) is its containing block function (definition 3.2.4). An actuator a is re-indexed from partition blocks
#(Ψ̂) to reactive stimulus space Ψ̂ through the composition:
a ◦⊞dom a : Ψ̂→ N.
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Proof. By definition 3.3.1, actuator a is a mapping from blocks of a partition of reactive space to a trans-
duction space. Suppose (B, νB) ∈ a. We desire to associate the transduction space point νB not with its
containing block B, but rather with a point ψ ∈ B in reactive space. Thus we re-introduce the containing
block conversion of definition 3.2.4, which maps points of reactive space to their containing blocks of the
partition. The actuator maps a : #(Ψ̂)→ N , and the containing block conversion maps⊞dom a : Ψ̂→ #(Ψ̂).
Thus the composite function maps (a ◦ ⊞dom a) : Ψ̂ → N . For any block B ∈ #(Ψ̂) and for any reactive
stimulus ψ ∈ B, (ψ, νB) ∈ a ◦⊞dom a as desired.
Definition 3.4.2 (transducer). Let a : #(Ψ̂) → N be an actuator per definition 3.3.1, and let ⊞dom a : Ψ̂ →
#(Ψ̂) be its containing block function (definition 3.2.4). A transducer is a re-indexed actuator
a ◦⊞dom a : Ψ̂→ N of lemma 3.4.1.
Remark. A transduction applies a re-indexed actuator a ◦ ⊞dom a : Ψ̂ → N to infer the value ν ∈ N from a
reactive stimulus.
3.5 Actuator network and labels
Labels facilitate identifying the current position in the automaton’s stepwise network of decisions (actuators)
and consequent actions (functionalities). To this end, each actuator is assigned a unique identifier called a
locus. A locus is simply a location identifier (address) for an actuator.
Definition 3.5.1. A locus is a label for an actuator.
The impetus for this term is its use as a target of a “goto” statement in programming languages. The inter-
rogative “goto where?” implies that a location (locus) is the desired response. Loci become the foundation
for connectivity in a network of actuators.
3.6 Space of transduction
Consider an actuator, which is a mapping between the blocks of a partition of reactive space (“positions”)
and an otherwise unrelated set of values. Suppose the mapping is multi-valued, consisting of
• the current functionality, which transforms the current reactive stimulus into the current response, and
• the next locus, which is the basis for transition in a network.
In any reactive actuated automaton, the transduced value of each actuator consists of an ordered pair: the
current functionality and the next locus.
Definition 3.6.1. The transduction space of an actuator is the set F × Λ. A member (f , λ′) is a transduced
value.
Theorem 3.6.2 (the transduced values). The values transduced from actuator a, applied at reactive stimulus
ψ, are:
(f , λ′) = (a ◦⊞dom a)(ψ) ∈ F × Λ
or, individually :
f = absc ((a ◦⊞dom a)(ψ)) ∈ F
f (ψ) = (absc ((a ◦⊞dom a)(ψ)))(ψ) ∈ Φ̂
λ′ = ord ((a ◦⊞dom a)(ψ)) ∈ Λ.
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Proof. Actuation from reactive stimulusmeans the re-indexing of an actuator with respect to reactive stimulus
(lemma 3.4.1). Let ⊞dom a be the block conversion mapping for dom a, the partition of actuator a (see §3.2
and definition 3.2.4). Applying this lemma to the actuator a, the re-indexed actuator is (fi, λ
′) = (a ◦
⊞dom a)(ψ).
The remaining formulas are straightforward manipulations of the abscissa, ordinate, and application opera-
tions.
Consider a transducer a ◦ ⊞dom a : Ψ̂ → F × Λ (re-indexed actuator, definition 3.4.2). This means that
(f , λ′) ∈ F × Λ is the transduced value (theorem 3.6.2). Functionality f completes frame f = (ψ, f (ψ)),
and λ′ becomes the locus of the next actuator.
Remark. The number of transductions is finite. One must not mistake the cardinality of transductions for
the cardinality of arguments to the transducer (a ◦ ⊞dom a)(φ), which is |Ψ̂|. The variety of transductions is
limited by Cauchy-Schwarz, |F × Λ| ≤ |F ||Λ|.
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Chapter 4
Catalogs
Discrete systems theory (software) is identified with the reactive actuated automaton (RAA). The term “dis-
crete” designates that each automaton step is associated with a finite dead time, during which no event is
recorded.
An automaton is a self-governing machine whose architecture of stimuli and responses automates an algo-
rithm. The deterministic finite automaton (DFA, see example in appendix D.1) is a simple structure describing
transit-based behavior. However, the DFA does not explain the underlying physics by which transitions are
accomplished. The DFA can be modified to make explicit the mechanism governing state transition. The
result is the reactive actuated automaton, which mechanizes logic using structure analogous to programming
language. An informal analogy between a reactive actuated automaton and a programming language will be
proposed at the end of this section.
4.1 Inventory of catalogs
The reactive actuated automaton is constructed from intertwined sets of sets. Each of these sets is given the
special name catalog.
4.1.1 Catalog of reactivity
The catalog of reactivity is similar to the previous definition of reactive basis (definition 2.1.6). Accurately
(Φ,Ξ) is a catalog while its closure (Φ̂, Ξ̂) is a reactive basis.
4.1.2 Catalog of functionalities
Functionalities were introduced earlier in §2.5.
Definition 4.1.1 (catalog of functionality). Let Φ̂ × Ξ̂ be a reactive basis with total stimulus Ψ̂ = Φ̂Ξ̂. A
finite subset F ⊆ Φ̂Ψ̂ is a catalog of functionality.
Definition 4.1.2 (procedure). Let Φ̂×Ξ̂ be a reactive basis and supposeF ⊆ Φ̂Ψ̂ is a catalog of functionality.
A procedure is a sequence {fn} : N→ F .
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4.1.3 Catalogs of loci and actuation
Since one is a label for the other, the catalogs of loci and actuation are interrelated.
Definition 4.1.3 (catalog of actuation). The catalog of actuationA ⊆ N#(Ψ̂) is a finite subset of the collection
of actuators.
Definition 4.1.4 (catalog of loci). A catalog of loci is a set Λ, each element λ of which bijectively identifies
some member of the catalog of actuation.
Notation 4.1.5 (anonymous label bijection). By hypothesis, there exists an anonymous bijection Λ → A
between loci and actuators. Temporarily allow the symbol “♦” to stand for this bijection. The application
♦(λ) is represented in de-referencing notation as ∗λ.
Remark. The symbol for the anonymous label bijection will be used only in this section, §4.1.3. The nota-
tion ∗λ will be preferred because it is already familiar as the de-referencing symbol in the C programming
language.
Theorem 4.1.6. The application of the anonymous label bijection (♦) at λ ∈ Λ is an actuator ∗λ.
Proof. The anonymous label bijection ♦ : Λ → A is a mapping, and A ⊆ N#(Ψ̂), the set of actuators; hence
♦(λ) ∈ N#(Ψ̂). By notation 4.1.5, ♦(λ) = ∗λ.
Definition 4.1.7. Let Λ be a catalog of loci. A path is a sequence of actuator labels {λn} : N→ Λ
(see McCabe, appendix E).
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Chapter 5
Configuration
The subject of the previous chapter was information structures called catalogs. The present topic is how these
catalogs combine into a system.
5.1 Configuration space and configuration
Definition 5.1.1 (configuration space). The configuration space for a reactive actuated automatonA consists
of six synchronized catalogs: a reactive basis Φ̂×Ξ̂, along with catalog of actuationA, catalog of functionality
F , and catalog of loci Λ. This configuration space is the Cartesian product
Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ.
Automata exist in many varieties. Since the reactive actuated automaton occupies the entire present scope of
interest, we forgo mandatory use of the qualifiers “reactive” and “actuated.”
Definition 5.1.2 (configuration). A configuration c = (φ, ξ, a, f , λ) is a member of the configuration space
Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ.
5.2 Configuration and unique state
Axiom 5.2.1. With each configuration is associated exactly one state.
5.3 Projections and functions of a configuration
A configuration has several components; it’s described by a whole-to-constituent relation. The mappings that
invert this relationship are called projections.
Definition 5.3.1 (Projections). Let c = (φ, ξ, a, f , λ) be amember of configuration spaceC = Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ.
A projection is a mapping ℧ from the set of configurations C to one of its components.
Projections of particular interest are:
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locus projection ℧Λ : C→ Λ: set ℧Λ(φ, ξ, a, f , λ) = λ.
functionality projection℧F : C→ F : set ℧F (φ, ξ, a, f , λ) = f .
actuator projection ℧A : C→ A: set ℧A(φ, ξ, a, f , λ) = a.
Definition 5.3.2 (frame function). The frame function (mapping) is ℧F(φ, ξ, a, f , λ) = (φξ, f (φξ)) = f .
5.4 Connectedness of configurations
With each current configuration is associated a family of possible next configurations, dependent on the
choice of the next stochastic stimulus. This next configuration has a complication: its value is uncertain
before the current frame, and becomes certain only after its observation in the next frame (axiom 2.2.2).
Definition 5.4.1 (parametric family of current configurations). The set of current configurations is a three-
parameter family Kcurr of configurations:
Kcurr(φ, ξ, λ) = (φ, ξ, fcurr, acurr, λ) = (φcurr, ξcurr, fcurr, acurr, λcurr)
where:
(φcurr, ξcurr, λcurr) = (φ, ξ, λ) ∈ Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ (free parameters)
acurr = ∗λ (dereference of current actuator)
fcurr = absc ((acurr ◦⊞dom acurr)(φξ)) (functionality transduced from current actuator)
Rationale. Lemma 3.4.1 (actuator re-indexing), notation 4.1.5 (anonymous label bijection), theorem 3.6.2
(the transduced values), and embedded side comments.
Definition 5.4.2 (parametric family of next configurations). The set of next configurations is a four-parameter
family Knext of configurations:
Knext(φ, ξ, λ, ξ
′) = (φnext, ξnext, anext, fnext, λnext) ∈ Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ
where:
φ, ξ, λ, ξ′ (free parameters)
acurr = ∗λ (dereference of current actuator)
fcurr = absc ((acurr ◦⊞dom acurr)(φξ)) (functionality transduced from current actuator)
λnext = ord ((acurr ◦⊞dom acurr)(φξ)) (next locus transduced from current actuator)
ϕcurr = fcurr(φξ) (response from current actuator)
φnext = ϕcurr = fcurr(φξ) (feedback from current response to next stimulus)
ξnext = ξ
′
anext = ∗λnext (dereference of next actuator)
fnext = absc ((anext ◦⊞dom anext)(φnextξnext)) (functionality transduced from next actuator)
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Rationale. Lemma 3.4.1 (actuator re-indexing), notation 4.1.5 (anonymous label bijection), theorem 3.6.2
(the transduced values), and embedded side comments.
Definition 5.4.3 (connected configurations). Let c1 = (φ1, ξ1, a1, f1, λ1) and c2 = (φ2, ξ2, a2, f2, λ2) be two
configurations. If c1 ∈ Kcurr(φ1, ξ1, λ1) and c2 ∈ Knext(φ1, ξ1, λ1, ξ2), then c1 is directionally connected to
c2.
Notation 5.4.4. The notation c1 ≺ c2 signifies “directionally connected” and c1 ⊀ c2 otherwise.
Remark. Connectivity of configurations (≺) is not generally transitive.
5.5 Trajectory
Definition 5.5.1 (walk). A walk is a sequence of configurationsN→ Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ.
Definition 5.5.2 (trajectory). A walk {cn}, each configuration ci of which is directionally connected to the
following configuration ci+1, is a trajectory (compare definition 2.4.3).
Nomenclature. The term “run” is synonymous with trajectory.
Remark. It is possible that a particular configuraton appears in one run but not in another.
Definition 5.5.3 (finite run). An initial segment of a run (trajectory).
5.6 Inductive behavior of automaton runs
A reactive actuated automaton A is a class of configurations in Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ. A run of automaton A
is also dependent on a starting configuration c0.
Definition 5.6.1 (automaton run). An automaton run {cn} is an inductive sequence built from connected
members of the configuration space Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ:
Base Clause: For some (initial) configuration c0, c0 ∈ A.
Inductive Clause: For any configurations c and c′, c ∈ Kcurr(φ, ξ, λ) (theorem 5.4.1) and
c′ ∈ Knext(φ, ξ, λ, ξ˙) (theorem 5.4.2), c
′ ∈ A if and only if c ∈ A.
This inductive class of configurations is based on an intersection of the two parametric families: the current
family of configurations, and the next family of configurations .
16
Chapter 6
State spaces
A state space is a proper subset of the configuration of the reactive actuated automaton that carries information
equivalent to the entire configuration. By “carries information” we shall mean that the full set is algebraically
recoverable from the subset. We will identify two varieties of state space: indigenous and triune step. Triune
step state space is inspired by explicit operation of the automaton’s configuration space, while indigenous
state space considers a minimal sufficient subset of the configuration space.
Regardless of which state space is used, the reactive actuated automaton has the same configuration space.
6.1 Triune step state space
While leaving undefined the notion of a step in an algorithm, we do formalize it for the automaton, where
a triune step is equivalent to three individual points: one from a path (definition 8.5.2). one from a process
(definition 8.5.2). and one from a procedure (definition 8.5.2).
A triune step consists of processing an actuator, which induces a functionality and a transition to the next
actuator. This information is included in the Cartesian product of the catalogs of loci, functionality, and
frames.
Definition 6.1.1 (triune step space). Let Λ be a catalog of loci, and suppose basis Φ̂× Ξ̂ underlies the catalog
of functionality F ⊆ Φ̂Φ̂Ξ̂ and the frame space F = Φ̂Ξ̂× Φ̂. A triune step space S is the Cartesian product
S = Λ×F × F.
Nomenclature (triune step). A triune step state is a point in triune step space.
Theorem 6.1.2. The configuration (φ, ξ, a, f , λ) ∈ Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ is algebraically regenerable from
the triune step state s = (λ, f , f).
Proof. The values of λ ∈ Λ, f ∈ F , and f ∈ F are given by hypothesis. Other values may be read off
directly. The value of actuator a ∈ A is a = ∗λ (see notation 4.1.5). The total reactive stimulus ψ is absc f ,
which has dyadic constituents φ = absc f ↾domΦ ∈ Φ̂ and ξ = absc f ↾domΞ ∈ Ξ̂.
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6.2 Indigenous state space
The reactive actuated automaton’s configuration space Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ is interlocked. Indigenous state
space is one answer to which components comprise a minimum sufficient set.
Definition 6.2.1 (indigenous space). Indigenous state spaceH is the Cartesian product Λ× Ψ̂ of the catalog
of loci and the space of reactive stimulus.
Members of indigenous space are called indigenous states. Indigenous states compactly summarize the oper-
ational condition of an automaton, and map to equivalent steps.
Theorem 6.2.2. The configuration (φ, ξ, a, f , λ) ∈ Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ is algebraically recoverable from
the indigenous state η = (λ, ψ).
Proof. The values of λ ∈ Λ and ψ ∈ Ψ̂ are given by hypothesis. The value of actuator a ∈ A is a = ∗λ (see
notation 4.1.5). The given reactive stimulus ψ has dyadic constituents φ = ψ ↾domΦ ∈ Ξ̂ and ξ = ψ ↾domΞ
∈ Ξ̂. The functionality f is transduced from actuator a: f = absc ((a ◦⊞dom a)(ψ)) ∈ F (see theorem
3.6.2).
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Chapter 7
The reactive actuated automaton
7.1 Principle of operation
Operation of the RAA is recognized as the base and repetitive clauses of an inductive form:
1. Initialize. [definition 7.1.2]
2. Cycle. [definition 7.1.1]
3. Go To 2. [Repeat]
Initialize is the base clause of the inductive form, which prepares the automaton’s context. Cycle is the
organization of RAA subtasks for the repetitive clause.
Remark. Before undertaking initialization, it is necessary to examine the cycle to discover and classify its
sensitivities.
7.1.1 Cycle
Cycle is the organization of RAA subtasks for the inductive clause.
Definition 7.1.1 (cycle). A cycle of a reactive actuated automaton is a unit of work consisting of several
ordered subtasks:
1. Observe the current values of the stochastic stimuli
ξcurr = stochastic (Ξ̂) [random sample].
2. Update the current stimulus as the union of the current stochastic stimulus and the previous response
ψcurr = ϕprev ∪ ξcurr [feedback, §2.4].
3. Update the current locus as the previous cycle’s next actuator locus
λcurr = λprev.
4. Determine actuator addressed by current locus
acurr = ∗λcurr [dereference notation 4.1.5].
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5. Determine the transduced quantities (current functionality and next locus)
(fcurr, λnext) = (acurr ◦⊞dom acurr)(ψcurr) [theorem 3.6.2].
6. Determine the current response by applying the current functionality to the current reactive stimulus
ϕcurr = fcurr(ψcurr).
7.1.2 Initialize
It is evident that cycle goes awry whenever ϕprev (step 2) or λprev (step 3) is undefined. On the first cycle,
these are not defined, so ψcurr and λcurr are not updated. Initialize, the base clause of the inductive form,
must establish reasonable defaults.
Definition 7.1.2 (initializer). Let {cn} be the trajectory to be initialized.
• If there exists a configuration c such that c ≺ c1, set actuator a = ℧A(c).
• Compute the transduced values (ϕprev, λprev) = (a ◦⊞dom a)(ψ) (theorem 3.6.2).
The value (ϕprev, λprev) is a valid initializer for c1.
7.2 Halting
Theorem 7.2.1 (reactive systems do not halt). Regardless of stimulus, in a system the next configuration is
completely and uniquely defined through next actuator.
Proof. Regardless of stimulus, the next configuration in a system is completely and uniquely defined through
next actuator.
7.3 Sketch of programming language analogy
The reactive actuated automaton is a network of actuators. Each actuator may possess many alternate func-
tionalities and successor actuators.
The automaton configuration space Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ of definition 5.1.1 resembles an elementary pro-
gramming language. The following comprise an oversimplified analogy:
• the domain of deterministic class Φ represents ordinary program variables;
• the domain of stochastic class Ξ represents read-only external inputs
(e.g. sensors, remote commands);
• actuators in class A represent if-then-elsif-else contingencies;
• the transduced functionality f represents a reactive stimulus that modifies deterministic variables;
and
• the transduced label λ is a “goto” indicating the next actuator to be exercised.
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Chapter 8
Reactive iteration
Iteration is the transition of an automaton from its current configuration to the next configuration, which is
unique for deterministic phenomena. Reactive iteration generalizes automorphic iteration; the difference lies
in stochastic stimuli.
In automorphic iteration, all information required to complete an iteration resides in deterministic stimuli.
This condition is not true of reactive iteration.
8.1 Reactivity
Reactivity concerns response to stimuli.
Nomenclature (observation). Observation of a stochastic stimulus is the term used for determining its instan-
taneous value.
Axiom 8.1.1 (value of stochastic stimulus). The value of a stochastic stimulus is observable at any instant of
time.
Remark. This law does not preclude that the observed value of a stochastic variable can be copied into a
deterministic variabe for later reference.
For the reactive actuated automaton, the status of a collection of stochastic stimuli is simultaneously observ-
able at any instant. This occurs as step 1 of the cycle sub-process (definition 7.1.1).
Axiom 8.1.2 (stochastic-deterministic confusion). The value of any stochastic stimulus cannot be set or
influenced by any deterministic stimuli.
8.2 Iteration
Iteration involves at least two adjacent cycles (definition 7.1.1) and creates a trajectory segment (definition
5.5.2).
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8.3 Summary of forward reactive iteration
The following two-cycle table is summarized from the explicit iteration formulae of definitions 5.4.1, 5.4.2,
and theorem 3.6.2
Cycle Configuration Item Formula
current φcurr (free parameter)
ξcurr stochastic (Ξ̂) pseudo-funtion
λcurr (free parameter)
acurr ∗λcurr
fcurr absc ((acurr ◦⊞dom acurr)(φcurrξcurr))
next φnext ϕcurr = fcurr(φcurrξcurr) [feedback]
ξnext stochastic (Ξ̂) pseudo-function
anext ∗λnext
fnext absc ((anext ◦⊞dom anext)(φnextξnext))
λnext ord ((anext ◦⊞dom anext)(φnextξnext))
Table 8.1: Configuration at end of cycle
8.4 Reverse iteration
Our construction of automata has provided that configurations unfold sequentially – that is, the next configu-
ration becomes known after completing the current configuration. Consequently automata inherit an intrinsic
“forward” orientation. It is also reasonable to inquire what configuration may have occurred previously. This
question is the motivation for reverse iteration, which considers automata operating backwards.
8.4.1 Reverse inference
Suppose “inference” is the task of determining what configuration must follow another in a trajectory. Be-
cause the reactive actuated automaton is a system, this configuration must be unique. (see axiom 5.2.1)
Consequently, reverse inference is identifying all immediate predecessor steps cn−1 such that cn = A(cn−1).
We have
A−1(c) = {c˜ ∈ C : A(˜c) = c}.
Remark. Although referring informally to the inverse A−1 of automaton A, speaking precisely we have
defined the inverse c˜ of a configuration c ∈ C within the configuration space.
8.4.2 Reverse inference as subset of configuration space
Definition 8.4.1. Let c ∈ C be a configuration and configuration space, Reverse inference u−1(c) is the
mapping a−1 : C→ P(C) defined by
u−1(c) = {c˜ ∈ C : u(˜c) = c},
where P(C) denotes the power set of C.
In other words, the reverse inference relation is a mapping from a configuration to a set of configurations.
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8.5 Reactive morphism
Definition 8.5.1 (reactive morphism). Let C be the set of all configurations and Ξ̂ be the included set
of stochastic stimuli. A reactive morphism is a mapping v : C → CΞ̂, where v(φ1, ξ1, a1, f1, λ1) =
(ξ2, (φ2, ξ2, a2, f2, λ2)), and also ξ2 (first instance) equals ξ2 (second instance).
Remark. (ξ2, (φ2, ξ2, a2, f2, λ2)) is a term of the mapping C
Ξ̂ in which ξ2 appaers twice.
The work to determine (φ1, ξ1, a1, f1, λ1) ≺ (φ2, ξ2, a2, f2, λ2) is implicit in the reactive morphism v (defini-
tion 5.4.3).
8.5.1 Reactive morphism equality constraint
Let C be the set of configurations and Ξ̂ be the set of stochastic stimuli. The sets overlap in the sense Ξ̂ ∈ C.
This can possibly introduce ambiguity, as illustrated by the expansion to elementary terms of (ξ2, (φ2, ξ2, a2, f2, λ2))
of the expression CΞ̂. The ambiguity is whether the duplicates of ξ2 are free or bound.
Definition 8.5.2 (reactive morphism equality constraint). Definition 8.5.1 states that a reactive morphism is
a mapping v : C → CΞ̂ (or v : C → (Ξ̂ → C)). It is understood that the repeated value of ξ ∈ Ξ̂ must equal
the value embedded within C. This condition is here called the reactive morphism equality onstraint.
8.5.2 Inverse of reactive morphism
The space of stochastic stimuli is part of configureation. Over the configuration space, the reactive mor-
phism takes the abstract form C → CΞ̂. A reactive morphism has abscissa (φ1, ξ1, a1, f1, λ1) and ordinate
(ξ2, (φ2, ξ2, a2, f2, λ2)). According to set theory, the inverse of the reactive morphism has the ordinate-
implies-abscissa representation
(ξ2, (φ2, ξ2, a2, f2, λ2))→ (φ1, ξ1, a1, f1, λ1).
Remark. Both the reactive morphism and its inverse are mappings,
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Chapter 9
Cones
A cone is a construct prepared with the inverse of a reactive actuated automaton. It consists of all finite
backwards trajectories converging to a given point.
Although the term “cone” is more ideologic than geometric, to preserve intuition this chapter uses triune step
space rather than configuration. The two are equivalent (theorem 6.1.2).
9.1 Description
The reactive actuated automaton possesses a non-deterministic1 inverse relation. See §8.5.2.
A collection of reverse trajectories is realized through repetitive re-application of the inverse, converging to
a designated crux triune step. These iterative chains may be bounded (trimmed to finite length) by enforcing
some stopping criterion. This construction results in the cone, a structured set of possible bounded trajectories
eventually leading to the crux triune step. The starting points of such trajectories are known as precursor steps
of the crux triune step.
9.1.1 Predecessor generations
Definition 9.1.1. HypothesizeA as a reactive actuated automaton containing configuration c0. Let u : C→ C
be a mapping with reverse inference relation u−1 : C→ P(C).
(base clause) Let base protoset C
(0)
♥ = {ccrux} be the 0
th predecessor generation of a0.
(inductive clause) The (n+ 1)st generation predecessors are defined in terms of the nth generation:
C
(n+1)
♥ =
⋃
c∈C
(n)
♥
u−1(c).
Remark. This definition places protoset C
(1)
♥ = u
−1(c0).
For a discussion of protoset C
(n)
♥ in context of the Cartesian product, see Appendix §A.5.4.
1That is, the inverse is not generally a pointwise invertible mapping as often suggested by the term inverse.
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9.2 Inductive definition of predecessor generations
Definition 9.2.1. Let S be a triune step space containing crux step acrux. Suppose u : S → S is an automor-
phism with reverse inference relation u−1 : S→ P(S).
(base clause) Let base protosetG
(0)
♥ = {acrux} be the 0
th predecessor generation of acrux.
(inductive clause) The (n+ 1)st generation predecessors are defined in terms of the nth generation:
G
(n+1)
♥ =
⋃
a∈G
(n)
♥
u−1(a).
Remark. This definition places protosetG
(1)
♥ = u
−1(acrux).
For a discussion of protosetG
(n)
♥ in context of the Cartesian product, see Appendix §A.5.4.
Definition 9.2.2. If G
(n)
♥ (acrux}) = ∅ for some natural number n, then acrux is said to be isolated.
Remark. If acrux is isolated, it means that its set of n
th generation predecessors is empty. This set is without
predecessors in terms of the inverse automaton, and is consequently unapproachable by forward steps of the
parent automaton.
9.3 Predecessor trajectory
A predecessor trajectory begins at triune step a0 = acrux and proceeds backwards, indexing through the
negative integers. We abuse the proper sense of the term “sequence” by permitting an indexing not being the
natural numbers.
Definition 9.3.1. Let S be a triune step space. A bounded predecessor trajectory starting with step a0 = acrux
is a finite sequence in triune step space such that ai−1 ≺ ai for every i ≤ 0.
Remark. For example in the case i = −2, we have a−3 ≺ a−2.
Since a bounded predecessor trajectory w is a finite sequence of steps, then it has a finite number of terms
which run in index i from −(n− 1) ≤ i ≤ 0, where n = |w | <∞ is the number of triune steps in w .
Definition 9.3.2. A setW of bounded predecessor trajectories, all starting at w0 = scrux, is complete if
∀(w ∈W)∀(−(|w | − 2) ≤ i ≤ 0)∀(s ∈ v−1(wi))∃(e ∈W) : wi = ei ∧ s = ei−1.
Remark. Completeness assures combinatorial diversity by preventing sub-walk duplication.
Definition 9.3.3. Let w and w ′ be localized predecessor walks starting at w0 = w
′
0 = scrux. Suppose the
length of w is |w | = n and the length of w ′ is |w ′| = m, with m ≤ n. If w ′(i) = w(i) for every
−(m− 1) ≤ i ≤ 0, then w and w ′ are dependent with w ′ dispensable.
Definition 9.3.4. LetW be a set of localized predecessor walks starting at s0 = scrux. The set is independent
if it contains no dispensable member.
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9.3.1 Cone
Definition 9.3.5. A cone C is a complete independent set of localized predecessor walks starting at scrux.
Remark (Stopping rule). We avoid the specificity of various stopping criteria (§9.1) by introducing the equiv-
alent but arbitrary notion of localization.
Definition 9.3.6. Let W be a set of bounded predecessor trajectories starting at a0 = acrux. The set is
independent if it contains no dispensable member.
9.4 The cone formalism
Definition 9.4.1. A cone C is a complete independent set of bounded predecessor trajectories starting at
non-isolated (definition 9.2.2) triune step acrux.
Remark. In definition 9.4.1, it is profoundly difficult to detect the existential condition of non-isolation.
Remark. (Stopping rule) We avoid the specificity of various stopping criteria (§9.1) by introducing the equiv-
alent but arbitrary notion of boundedness.
Definition 9.4.2. Let C be a cone with w ∈ C a member bounded predecessor trajectory. Suppose n = |w | is
the number of steps in w . The terminus w(−(n− 1)) = w−(n−1) is the edge triune step of trajectory w .
Definition 9.4.3. Let C be a cone. Its edge, written edge C, is the collection of edge steps of all member
bounded predecessor trajectories.
Definition 9.4.4. An acyclic cone has no cycle (loop) in its path projection ℧Λ (see §??).
Theorem 9.4.5. The acyclic cone C and edge C are in one-to-one correspondence via the edge triune step
relation of a bounded predecessor trajectory.
Proof. Assume the opposite: there are different bounded predecessor trajectories with the same edge triune
step. Let u and v be two different trajectories with common edge triune step acommon.
Suppose |u| = m and |v| = n, so the indexes of acommon are −(m− 1) and −(n− 1) respectively.
We assert that if u−(m−1)+i = v−(n−1)+i for some 0 ≤ i, then u−(m−1)+(i+1) = v−(n−1)+(i+1).
Suppose sequencing is governed by a reactive actuated automaton A. So sequenced, the next triune step
in predecessor trajectory u is u−(m−1)+(i+1) = A(u−(m−1)+i). Similarly, the next triune step in v is
v−(n−1)+(i+1) = A(v−(n−1)+i). But if u−(m−1)+i = v−(n−1)+i, then A(u−(m−1)+i) = A(v−(n−1)+i) =
A(a). By transitivity of equality, u−(m−1)+(i+1) = A(a) = v−(n−1)+(i+1).
Without loss of generality supposem ≤ n. Then u−(m−1)+i = v−(n−1)+i is true for i = 0, 1, ... m− 1. At
i = m− 1 we have acrux = u0 = v−(n−1)+(m−1) = v−(n−m). Since v is a bounded predecessor trajectory of
a cone, then v0 = acrux. But v0 = acrux = v−(n−m). Because the cone is assumed acyclic, v0 and v−(n−m)
must then be the same identical triune step – that is,m = n.
Here the assumption of two different bounded predecessor trajectories with the same edge triune step leads
to the contradiction that both are indeed the same identical trajectory. This means bounded predecessor
trajectories within an acyclic cone C are in one-to-one correspondence with edge C via the edge triune step
relation.
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9.5 Hazards and multiple cone collections
When a cone having a single crux is insufficient to encompass a given hazard, then a collection of cones is
likely to suffice. One example is the path-convergent family of cones:
Definition 9.5.1. For some λ0 ∈ Λ, eachmemberw of a path-convergent family of cones satisfies℧Λ(w crux) =
λ0.
Remark. A path-convergent collection does not necessarily include all walks w such that ℧Λ(w crux) = λ0.
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Chapter 10
Counting in trajectories
Remark. The following chapters frequently use the compound idiom that {xn} represents an anonymous
sequence of objects of the same type as x. That is, ifX is the set of all xi, then {xn} : N→ X .
10.1 Marked configurations
Recall that definition 5.1.2 states that a configuration c = (φ, ξ, a, f , λ) is a member of the configuration
space C = Φ̂× Ξ̂× A×F× Λ.
Let {cn} be a trajectory (infinite sequence of connected configurations) and let Z be an arbitrary marked set
of configurations. Simply summarized, NZ({cn}, k) counts the number of occurrences of any member of Z
before or at the kth automaton configuration.
For those interested, details follow:
Definition 10.1.1 (marked set). A marked set Z is a finite subset of the collection of all configurations
occurring in a trajectory {cn}.
Definition 10.1.2 (arrival). When the ith configuration of the trajectory {cn} is a member of Z (that is,
ci ∈ Z), then {cn} is said to arrive at i.
Definition 10.1.3 (arrival function). An arrival function is a sequence ϕ = {(1, n1), (2, n2), · · · } mapping
each arrival, as identified by its ordinal occurrence number i, into its frame sequence number ni.
This means that the first arrival occurs at frame sequence n1, the second at n2, et cetera. The arrival function
assumes the natural order, that is, i < j implies ni < nj .
A related function counts how many arrivals occur within a given duration:
Definition 10.1.4 (counting function). Suppose {cn} is a trajectory and Z is a set of arbitrarily marked
configurations. Let ϕ be an arrival function. The counting function induced by the arrival function ϕ is
NZ({cn}, k) = max{i : ϕ(i) ≤ k},
and for completeness set max(∅) = 0.
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10.2 Classification of counting ratios
A relative counting ratio is the conditional probability that a configuration in a reactive actuated automaton’s
trajectory coincides with a particular member of the marked set, given that it agrees with the marked set.
We consider one other: an absolute counting ratio is the time rate at which a particular configuration of a
trajectory coincides with any member of the marked set.
10.2.1 Ratios of counting functions
We apply the counting procedure of §10.1, which counts the occurrences NZ({cn}, k) of marked set Z in
trajectory {cn} before or at configuration k.
For a trajectory {cn}, given a marked set Z , a member z of the marked set, and the whole space C, there are
two forms of counting function ratios of interest. First is the relative counting function ratio:
qz(k) =
N{z}({cn}, k)
NZ({cn}, k)
There are |Z| possible relative counting ratios, one for each z ∈ Z .
Q(k) =
NZ({cn}, k)
NC({cn}, k)
=
NZ({cn}, k)
k
.
Because C is the whole space, then NC({cn}, k) counts each configuration, and equals k.
The qz(k) are relative frequencies, whereas Q(k) is absolute. The relative frequencies may be converted to
absolute by multiplication: Qz(k) = qz(k) ·Q(k).
10.3 Limits of counting ratios
10.3.1 Probability
Let {cn} be a trajectory. Suppose z ∈ Z ⊂ C is a configuration of the marked set. Software encounters
N{z}({cn}, k) instances of configurations satisfying {cn}(i) = ci = z during the first k automaton configu-
rations. In the same execution there are NZ({cn}, k) instances of ci ∈ Z . In the frequentist [13] school of
interpreting probability, when the limit exists,
P (z | Z) = lim
k→∞
qz(k)
Q(k)
= lim
k→∞
N{z}({cn}, k)
NZ({cn}, k)
represents the conditional probability of occurrence of z, given that Z occurs.
Definition 10.3.1 (relative counting ratio). Let Z be a marked set of which z is a member. A mappingOP is
a relative counting ratio over Z if for all z ∈ Z , (z, P (z | Z)) ∈ OP
Theorem 10.3.2. A relative counting ratio is a finite probability distribution.
Proof. Definition 10.1.1 asserts that marked set Z is finite; therefore a mapping containing one abscissa per
member of Z is finite (definition 10.3.1). Since each ordinate is a ratio of counts, then each is nonnegative.
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The following shows that the sum of limits is unity:
∑
z∈Z
P (z | Z) =
∑
z∈Z
lim
k→∞
N{z}({cn}, k)
NZ({cn}, k)
= lim
k→∞
∑
z∈Z
N{z}({cn}, k)
NZ({cn}, k)
[sum of limits equals the limit of sums]
= lim
k→∞
1
NZ({cn}, k)
∑
z∈Z
N{z}({cn}, k)
= lim
k→∞
NZ({cn}, k)
NZ({cn}, k)
[NZ({cn}, k) =
∑
z∈Z
N{z}({cn}, k)]
= 1
Thus P (z | Z) is a conditional probability distribution.
A relative counting ratio is a mappingOP : Z → [0, 1] having total measure 1.
10.3.2 Absolute ratio
Let {cn} be a trajectory. An absolute counting ratio is the probability P (Z) with which a trajectory (of
some usage pattern) coincides with any configuration of the marked set Z . As before, this probability is the
limiting ratio of two counting functions. Its numerator contains NZ({cn}, k), the same count as appears in
the denominator of the relative counting ratio. In its denominator is the counting function of all possible
configurations, namely NC({cn}, k), where C is the space of all configurations. Thus the ratio of counting
functions of marked set Z to the entire space C is NZ({cn},k)
NC({cn},k)
= NZ({cn},k)
k
, and the absolute counting ratio
(of collection Z) is
P (Z) = lim
k→∞
NZ({cn}, k)
k
.
Q(Z) =
NZ({cn}, k)
k
.
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Chapter 11
Operational profiles
For some trajectories the configuration counting ratio has an analytic limit. In this case the limiting quotient
is called an operational profile.
Remark. This chapter frequently uses the compound idiom that {xn} represents an anonymous sequence of
objects of the same type as x. That is, ifX is the set of all xi, then {xn} : N→ X .
11.1 Musa’s operational profile
Musa et al. intended operational profiles as a tool for analysis of software reliability. A notion of the opera-
tional profile appeared in their pioneering exposition [5]. The authors represent a program’s abstract purpose
as a collection of executable “run types”, which weren’t discussed further. Musa posits that an operational
profile is the program’s set of run types along their probability of occurrence.
Musa identified two intertwined concepts, the operational profile and the run type. The run type is envisioned
as an indivisible unit associated with a probability.
11.2 Extension of Musa concept
We will follow Musa’s successful lead with these two concepts, except we will pursue a partition with finer
granularity than the gross-scale run type. They will be partitioned into configurations, the elementary quan-
tum of automata. This approach focuses on algorithmic structure, detaching the operational profile concept
from higher-level human cognition of purpose. Despite appearances, this extension is not daunting – the only
needed addition is a method for counting configuration events.
The synchronization function allows expression of the absolute operational profile as an intensity (rate or
quasi-frequency).
Definition 11.2.1. The temporal norm is written using the double bar notation ‖·‖:
‖Z‖ = lim
k→∞
NZ({cn}, k)
sync({cn}, k)
.
The absolute operational profile is properly a subadditive seminorm on sets of configurations. As the limiting
ratio of two counts in the natural numbers, the norm is positive. The norm is a seminorm because for some
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nonempty set Z it may be true that ‖Z‖ = 0 (if the usage pattern does not activate any member of the marked
set). This norm is subadditive because for any other set S, NZ∪S({cn}, k) ≤ NZ({cn}, k) + NS({cn}, k).
It follows that ‖Z ∪ S‖ ≤ ‖Z‖+ ‖S‖.
11.3 Usage
While the notion of “purpose” will seem obvious to engineers, the same is less natural for mathematicians.
Related to purpose is “usage”. It is easier to explore through structure, which mathematically characterizes
usage. The idea behind a usage is exercise of a small number of subordinate routines to demonstrate fitness
for purpose. Since the number of routines comprising a usage is small, testing it repetitively will likely
involve unnatural manipulation of stochastic stimulus. It is usually not good to define usage through behavior
rather than philosophy.
11.3.1 Usage colorings
Definition 11.3.1 (usage). A usage is an alternating coloring scheme for trajectories that partitions a trajec-
tory into two sets of blocks. Each block of the partition is finite and colored either in or out.
Remark. In-blocks share the common purpose of the usage; out-blocks share nothing.
Definition 11.3.2. A trajectory exercises a usage if the in-blocks of the usage’s partition appear infinitely
often.
11.3.2 Usage colorings and marked sets
Definition 11.3.3. Let B be an in-block of the partition of trajectory τ induced by usage coloring#(τ). Let
z = inf B denote the infimum (greatest lower bound) of B.
Theorem 11.3.4. Z = {inf B : B ∈ Bin} is a marked set.
Proof. Section 10.1 places no restriction on marked sets other than that they be included in a trajectory.
{inf B : B ∈ Bin} is a subset of a trajectory because the blocks consitute a partition of the trajectory, and the
infimum is a member of a finite block..
Definition 11.3.5. Z = {inf B : B ∈ Bin} is called a usage-induced marked set.
11.4 Equivalence in usage
Definition 11.4.1. Two different trajectories {cn} and {c
′
n} are equivalent in usage if:
lim
k→∞
N{z}({cn}, k)
NZ({cn}, k)
= lim
k→∞
N{z}{c
′
n}, k)
NZ{c′n}, k)
[relative profiles; one for each z in marked set Z 6= ∅]
lim
k→∞
NZ({cn}, k)
NC({cn}, k)
= lim
k→∞
NZ({c
′
n}, k)
NC({c′n}, k)
[absolute profile; one for marked set Z 6= ∅].
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Chapter 12
Indemnification
Collections of related software tests are composed of fragments of a cone (chapter 9). These tests individually
pass or fail, but this perspective does not avail a collective view which considers that the collection of tests
shares a common cone.
Indemnification is a conglomerate statistic that considers the common cone relationship. Collections of tests
related by a single cone are converted to equivalent error-free operational time. These durations are summed
over the cone and interpreted as a Poisson process. This conversion enables software results to be expressed
in traditional hardware assurance units.
12.1 Background
Hypothesize that a software hazard is emulated by a compound Poisson process (CPP) having intensity λ and
expected loss µL. Suppose further that the actual control mechanism is a cone convergent to the software
point of exhibition of the hazard. We wish to consider statistical evidence that the hazard’s hypothetical
description via the stochastic process is consistent with its mechanism as revealed by safety demonstration.
Indemnification is conversion of pass/fail test data into the failure intensity of an equivalent Poisson process.
12.1.1 Conversion into a rate
For each configuration of a trajectory, an amount of real time appropriate for an software system emulating
the automaton’s configuration is added to the time consumption budget. Let Z be the usual arbitrary marked
collection of configurations and {cn} be a trajectory. These two provide a set of stochastic excitations and
a sequence of configurations in which to count the events’ arrivals. The synchronization records discrete
pairs (i, ti), where i is the index of the automaton configuration and tk is the total elapsed time after k
configurations. Call this mapping the synchronization function, having the formalism sync: CN × N→ R+,
along with assumed starting point sync({cn}, 0) = 0.
Let the sequence index of each configuration be the discrete analog of time. Of course, this has the effect that
discrete software time will not hold proportional to hardware real time. The approximate real time required
by execution of configuration c = (λ, f , f) is τ(f ) – that is, elapsed real time is taken as a function of the
executing functionality.
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Definition 12.1.1. For trajectory {cn}, approximate time elapsed during the first k configurations accumu-
lates to
sync({cn}, k) =
k∑
i=1
τ(fi)) =
k∑
i=1
τ(℧F (ci)) = tk.
A theorem to avoid creating dependency on specific trajectories is in order.
Definition 12.1.2. The temporal norm with respect to trajectory {cn} is written using double bar notation
‖·‖{cn}:
‖Z‖{cn} = lim
k→∞
NZ({cn}, k)
sync({cn}, k)
.
The absolute counting ratio is properly a subadditive seminorm on sets of configurations. As the limiting
ratio of two counts in the natural numbers, the norm is positive. The norm is a seminorm because for some
nonempty set Z it may be true that ‖Z‖ = 0 (if the usage pattern does not activate any member of the marked
set). This norm is subadditive because for any other set S, NZ∪S({cn}, k) ≤ NZ({cn}, k) + NS({cn}, k).
It follows that ‖Z ∪ S‖ ≤ ‖Z‖+ ‖S‖.
Remark. The synchronization function allows expression of the absolute counting ratio as an intensity (rate
or quasi-frequency).
Definition 12.1.3. For a marked set of configurations ∅ 6= Z ⊆ C, and different trajectories {cn} and {c
′
n}
having the same temporal norm (‖Z‖{cn} = ‖Z‖{c′n}), the trajectories are said to be of equivalent intensity
for the marked set.
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Chapter 13
Applied statistics
The safety demonstration furnishes data for the indemnification statistic, which originates in the compound
Poisson random process.
13.1 Reliability demonstration
A reliability demonstration is a structured random experiment carrying controlled statistical uncertainty and
providing “hard” evidence against potential liability.
13.1.1 Safety demonstration
In software safety analysis, a hazard is a region of code bearing potential harmful side effects if incorrectly
implemented. A safety demonstration is a special type of reliability demonstration posed to exercise a hazard.
Here the region is presumed to be an acyclic cone, with the hazard located at its crux. The crux is a point of
software/hardware transduction, illustrating the principle of emergence1 (see §??).
To oversimplify, a safety demonstration is a random sample from such a region (acyclic cone). The complete
story is not so simple, because the cone is not a probabilistic structure; it possesses no probability to support
randomness.
As a probabilistic structure, the operational profile (§10.3.1) permits random sampling from its marked set,
regardless of its higher level meaning. As the edge of a cone is a set, it can become a relative operational
profile’s marked set. Thus we tie an operational profile to a cone’s edge. LetO : edge C → [0, 1] be a relative
operational profile on the edge of cone C. At this stage we have the ability to draw a random sample from
edge C.
Theorem 9.4.5 asserts that an acyclic cone C and edge C are in one-to-one correspondence via the edge
configuration relation of a bounded predecessor trajectory. Equivalent to the one-to-one correspondence is
the bijection b = {(edgew ,w) : w ∈ C}. For e ∈ edge C, b(e) is the bijectively corresponding bounded
predecessor trajectory.
We now bijectively associate the random edge event e = b−1(w) with the bounded predecessor trajectory
w : O′ = {(O(b−1(w)),w) : w ∈ C}. With probability inherited from an operational profile, we can speak
1software causes no harm until erroneous values transduce the boundary between software and hardware.
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validly of a random sample from a cone.
13.1.2 Tests
The last piece of the safety demonstration story is converting bounded predecessor trajectories into tests.
Bounded predecessor trajectories are finite trajectories existing in confusion-prone backwards time. One
may skip this section unless he wishes the detail of converting backward to forward trajectories.
The test function reverses and re-indexes bounded predecessor trajectories into conventional sequences.
Definition 13.1.1. Let w be a bounded predecessor trajectory of n = |w | configurations, indexed from 0
down to −(n− 1). Define the test function t(w) = w˜ according to formula w˜i = wi−n for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Assuming that a bounded predecessor trajectory is indexed from 0 down to −(n− 1), its corresponding test
will be indexed from 1 to n. In sense of direction, the bounded predecessor trajectory traverses configurations
from ccrux to cedge, while the corresponding test traverses configurations from cedge to ccrux.
Theorem 13.1.2. Suppose C is an acyclic cone andW ⊂ C is a (unique) set of bounded predecessor trajec-
tories. If W˜ = t(W) is its converted set of reversed and re-indexed tests, thenW and W˜ are in one-to-one
correspondence.
Proof. By virtue of construction, t is already a mapping. Remaining to show is that t is additionally a
bijection. Let u and v be bounded predecessor trajectories and x be a finite trajectory. As hypothesis set
x = t(u) = t(v). These sequences cannot be equal unless they possess the same number of terms, n =
|x| = |t(u)| = |t(v)|. Since transformation t preserves the number of configurations (from Definition 13.1.1
|w | = |t(w)|), then n = |x| = |u| = |v|.
Again invoking Definition 13.1.1 on the first part of the hypothesis, we write xi = ui−n. The second part
similarly yields xi = vi−n. By equating the two parts, we now have ui−n = vi−n for each i. In other words,
the two bounded predecessor trajectories are actually the same trajectory: u = v. Thus t is a bijection.
Stochastic variables preservation
The danger in reversed thinking about tests is inadvertently conceptualizing stochastic variables as free. This
is untrue, as the stochastic variables at any stage of a predecessor chain are fixed, and the “next” stage
considers the set of what previous conditions may have led to the current stage. Thus, predecessor trajectories
are chains of a poset of configurations, which include the settings of stochastic variables. Onemust bemindful
to reproduce all stochastic stimuli of the bounded predecessor trajectory in its analogous test.
13.1.3 Outcome
The outcome of a test, pass or fail, will be regarded as a Bernoulli random event, Pρ = ρ
n(1− ρ)
1−n
, for
n = 1 (pass) or n = 0 (fail). These probabilities are statistically independent of the bias involved with
drawing the sample from the operational profile. This bias affects the origin of discovered failures, but not
how many failures are found. In other words, the total statistical power of the sampling plan is not affected
by sampling bias.
Sums of independent Bernoulli random variables are binomial. That is, the probability of finding n failures
collectively amongN sample items is binomial,
(
N
n
)
ρn(1− ρ)
N−n
.
36
13.1.4 Physics
In the real world, tests pass or fail depending on whether the information transduced at configuration ccrux
meets all safety constraints. Such engineering requirements are varied, ultimately involving position, tim-
ing, voltage, insulation, dimensional tolerance, toxicity, temperature, mechanical shielding, luminosity, and
hydrostatic pressure – just to name a few areas. Review of a test offers a last chance to discover a missed
constraint (requirement). Another possibility is that the chain of precursor events should actually lead to a
different conclusion.
Transduced values potentially control the status of any safety concern. Tests simply pass or fail, but evaluation
of why a test passes or fails can become nontrivial, requiring collaboration between mechanical, software,
and system safety engineers.
13.1.5 Statistics
Some statistical error originates in inference from random sample to “unknown” population (parametric fam-
ily of probability distributions on a measurable space). Just one distribution is true, while the others are false.
An assertion separating the parameterization into two decision units is called a hypothesis. One decision unit
is traditionally designated null, while the other is called alternate. The true distribution belongs either to the
null or alternative decision units.
Each sample item either passes or fails its associated test (see §13.1.4). Within the entire cone C, suppose the
proportion of tests that fail is ρ. This proportion is subsequently realized approximately through a random
sample. Regardless of the sample size, since the application is to safety, the only cases of interest will be
when the number of failures is zero. Other cases, implying need for reliability growth, are treated in the
literature, particularly [5].
We now examine the case defined by drawing a random sample of size N from edge C and allowing n = 0
failures in the associated tests from cone C. The null decision unit contains the probability distribution
P0(pass) = 1 and P0(fail) = 0. The alternate decision unit is the set of probability distributions Pρ having
0 < ρ ≤ 1. Hypothesis evaluation entails two types of error, known as α and β error.
False rejection (α error)
The first is false rejection of the null decision unit, with associated measurement error α. The sampling plan
can reject only if finds an error, so this sampling plan is incapable of false rejection. Thus α ≡ 0.
False acceptance (β error)
The second is false acceptance of the null decision unit, with associated measurement error β. We experience
false acceptance when 0 < ρ but the sample contains no failures.
Under the binomial model, the probability of observing a random sample of size N with n failures collec-
tively is
(
N
n
)
ρn(1− ρ)N−n. Proceeding to our case of interest, n = 0, we have
(
N
n
)
ρn(1− ρ)N−n
∣∣
n=0
=
(1− ρ)N . This expression is the probability that random samples of size N from a source of characteristic
failure proportion ρ will be accepted.
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Power function
It is confusing to reason in terms of contravariant2 attributes. In our case we formulate probability of rejection
as an increasing function of ρ, a measure of the population’s undesirability. The probability that random
samples will be properly rejected is the previous expression’s complement:
KN,0(ρ) = 1− (1− ρ)
N
= 1− β.
This non-contravariant result is known as the power function of sample size N , tolerating zero (0) failures.
The graph of the power function always increases, starting at 0 for ρ = 0 and ending at 1 for ρ = 1. Just
how fast this function increases in its midrange is determined by the sample size N . With sample size one
(N = 1),K1,0(ρ) = ρ.
N KN,0(.001) KN,0(.01) KN,0(.05) KN,0(.10) KN,0(.50) KN,0(.90)
1 .0010 .0100 .0500 .1000 .5000 .9000
5 .0050 .0490 .2262 .4095 .9688 1.0000
10 .0100 .0956 .4013 .6513 .9990 1.0000
15 .0149 .1399 .5367 .7941 1.0000 1.0000
20 .0198 .1821 .6415 .8784 1.0000 1.0000
30 .0296 .2603 .7854 .9576 1.0000 1.0000
50 .0488 .3950 .9231 .9948 1.0000 1.0000
100 .0952 .6340 .9941 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
200 .1814 .8660 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
500 .3936 .9934 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1000 .6323 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2000 .8648 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
5000 .9933 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
10000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Table 13.1: Family of power functions (probability of rejection)
Within this family β = (1− ρ)
N
= 1−KN,0(ρ).
One is initially dismayed by this sketch of the family of power functions; it suggests that high degrees of
assurance are unobtainable through random sampling using practical sample sizes. However, reasonable
performance useful for coarser screening is very possible. Detecting a defective population of 10 percent
with a probability of approximately 90% requires only 20 sample items.
13.1.6 Sampling philosophy
Our safety demonstration sampling technique contrasts two assurance philosophies – software reliability
versus software correctness. The software reliability perspective involves a separate operational profile on
edge C, whereas software correctness examines only the structure within cone C. The operational profile
asserts the importance of relative excitational intensity to safety analysis. An accident that occurs more
frequently is worse than an accident that happens less frequently, given that they are of comparable severity.
This safety factor is ignored under software correctness alone.
2One increasing, the other decreasing
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13.2 Modeling of accidents
Accidents are diverse in effect and mechanism, including injury, death, or damage either to equipment or
environment. Since the causality of accidents is temporarily unknown, they manifest an apparent nature
of unpredictability or randomness. However, under emulation as a stochastic process, the exact timing of
accidents is truly a random phenomenon rather than causal. Nevertheless, it has proven useful to compare
well-understood summary statistics of stochastic processes with those of deterministic but unknown physical
processes.
13.2.1 Compound Poisson process
Today’s prevalent safety model for the occurrence of accidents is the compound Poisson3 process. This
model captures accidents’ two dominant attributes: rate of occurrence (intensity) and scalar measure of loss
(severity). With some exceptions, neither the timing nor severity of one software accident affects another.
The compound Poisson process (CPP) is appropriate to model accidents of this nature.
As stochastic processes are models rather than mechanisms, deriving their properties involves somewhat
out-of-scope mathematics. The interested reader can immediately find greater detail in Wikipedia R© online
articles: [14], [15], [17], [18], and [?]. Relevant theorems will be documented here simply as facts.
13.2.2 Poisson processes
We will consider three variants of basic stochastic process: the ordinary Poisson process, the compound
Poisson process, and the intermittent compound Poisson process.
Ordinary Poisson process
(Ordinary) Poisson processes are characterized simply by their rate or intensity:
• its fundamental rate λ, which is the expected number of arrivals per unit time.
Fact 13.2.1. Let λ be the rate of a Poisson process. The probability of experiencing k arrivals in a time
interval t units long is
Pλ(k) = e
−λt (λt)
k
k!
.
Compound Poisson process
A compound Poisson process is characterized by two rates:
• its fundamental rate λ as before, and
• its rate of loss L, which is a random variable invoked once for each arrival.
3After Sime´on Denis Poisson, mathematician and physicist, 1781 – 1840
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Fact 13.2.2. Let λ be the rate and L be the loss random variable of a compound Poisson process. The
expectation of the compound process for a time interval t units long is
E(compound Poisson) = λt · E(L)
= λt · µL.
Definition 13.2.3. The statistical risk, written h, of a compound Poisson process is the time derivative of its
expectation in a duration of length t; that is
h =
d
dt
E(compound Poisson) =
d
dt
(λt · µL) = λµL,
which is the product of its rate λ and its expected loss µL.
Intermittent compound Poisson process
A variation of the CPP is the intermittent compound Poisson process, which is intermittently on or off with
expected durations E(on) = µon and E(off) = µoff. An intermittent compound Poisson process (ICPP) is
characterized by three rates:
• its fundamental rate λ as before, and
• its rate of loss L, also as before,
• alternating durations of random lengths τon and τoff.
Random variables τon and τoff converge to µon and µoff in the limit. The idle ratio of a intermittent compound
Poisson process is ι = µoff
µon+µoff
.
Fact 13.2.4. Let λ be the rate, L be the loss random variable, and ι be the idle ratio of an intermittent
compound Poisson process. The expectation of the ICPP for a time interval t units long is
E(intermittent compound Poisson) = (1− ι) · λt · E(L)
= (1− ι) · λt · µL.
The statistical risk of an ICPP is
h =
d
dt
E(intermittent compound Poisson)
=
d
dt
((1− ι) · λt · µL + ι · 0t · 0)
= (1− ι)λµL.
13.3 Indemnification
Hypothesize that a software hazard is emulated by a compound Poisson process (CPP) having intensity λ and
expected loss µL. Suppose further that the actual control mechanism is a cone convergent to the software
point of exhibition of the hazard. We wish to consider statistical evidence that the hazard’s hypothetical
description via the stochastic process is consistent with its mechanism as revealed by safety demonstration.
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13.3.1 Unification
Before undertaking the question of whether test data supports a hypothetical stochastic process, we must
establish the theoretical conditions under which equality is expected.
Fundaments of the model
The compound Poisson process is a model stochastic process for occurrence of accidents. This model is
used in safety analysis to quantify the occurrence and losses of accidents without considering their causes.
MIL-STD-882 (see Appendix C) is an important example. In a time interval of duration t, accidents converge
stochastically in rate to expectation λt and in mean loss to µL. This means an intensity of λ accidents per
time unit.
Fundaments of the mechanism
The reactive actuated automaton is a mechanism representing software. When extended by the principle of
emergence (§??) and the constructs of the operational profiles (§11) and cones (§??), it becomes capable
of representing precursor conditions for software accidents. Let ‖edge C‖ (see §12.1.1) be the rate-based
absolute operational profile of the edge of an acyclic cone C. Since a member of edge C is executed at the
average intensity of ‖edge C‖, then so is the cone’s configuration of convergence ccrux. Let ρ be the proportion
of failing tests (bounded predecessor trajectories). Under that supposition, failures occur at the intensity of
ρ · ‖edge C‖. The definition of ‖edge C‖, through the internal function sync(·), allows for the passage of time
in the proper duration.
Uniting mechanism and model
We presume that one failing test equals one accident. The cone’s configuration of convergence is considered
to be the point of exhibition of a hazard whenever safety constraints are not met. This mechanism may be
separately equated to the intensity (not the rate of loss) of the compound Poisson process:
λ = ρ · ‖edge C‖.
This equation places a property of the model on the left and properties of the mechanism on the right.
Remark. The execution rate of the edge of an acyclic cone numerically equals the execution rate of the
(set containing the) cone’s crux. The cone’s definitional status (as a complete independent set of bounded
predecessor trajectories ending at ccrux) causes this. Symbolically,
‖edge C‖ = ‖{ccrux}‖.
13.3.2 Evidence
We propose that the same data used earlier for indemnification testing be re-used in a slightly different statis-
tical context. Recall that an indemnification test hasN items among which are zero failures, where each item
is a bounded predecessor trajectory, and a cone is a structured collection of bounded predecessor trajectories
of an automaton.
We wish to measure the amount of information in an indemnification sample to explain the phenomenon that
larger samples justify more precise estimates than smaller samples. We refer to this information as measuring
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the weight of evidence. This situation differs from the familiar problem of finding the maximum likelihood
estimator.
Method of indifference
The power function of sample size N , tolerating zero (0) failures, isKN,0(ρ) = 1− (1− ρ)
N
(see §13.1.5).
It measures the probability of rejection as a function of ρ.
Each power function KN,0(ρ) = 1 − (1− ρ)
N
is characterized by its indifference proportion, which is
defined as the proportion at which rejection and acceptance become equally likely (that is, KN,0(ρˆ I) =
1/2 =
1 − KN,0(ρˆ I)). With only modest algebra, the analytic expression for the indifference proportion may be
derived from the power functionKN,0(ρ); it is
ρˆ I = 1−
N
√
1/2.
Below is a numerical tabulation of the previous formula:
N ρˆ indifference
1 .50000
5 .12945
10 .06697
15 .04516
20 .03406
30 .02284
50 .01377
100 .00691
200 .00346
500 .00139
1000 .00069
2000 .00035
5000 .00014
10000 .00007
Table 13.2: Indifference proportion
Indemnification formula
The indemnification formula provides a statistical upper bound on hazard intensity. Indemnification data may
be expressed as an equivalent statistical upper bound on hazard intensity. This differs fundamentally from
estimating the intensity of a hazard. By a statistically “guaranteed” hazard intensity, we mean an upper bound
such that the true hazard intensity is likely to fall beneath this level with known confidence (probability).
Suppose we choose 1/2 as the known confidence. The indifference proportion ρˆ I = 1 −
N
√
1/2 then has a
second interpretation as an upper bound with confidence 1/2. For any ρ ≤ ρˆ I, it is true that power function
PN,0(ρ) ≤
1/2, so ρˆ I is an upper bound of confidence
1/2.
To convert from the size of the indemnification sample into its equivalent upper bound hazard intensity, find
the indifference proportion ρˆ I = 1−
N
√
1/2.
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Check the sample physics. This amounts to analysis of the originating cone C, which is the point of exhibition
of a hazard whenever safety constraints are not met. The cone’s edge has an absolute operational profile
expressed as a rate. This quantity is the temporal norm of the cone’s edge.
We have shown that the probable upper bound of the hazard intensity is proportional to the indifference
proportion, with constant of proportionality furnished by the temporal norm of the cone’s edge. The indem-
nification formula is:
λˆ I = ρˆ I · ‖edge C‖ = ρˆ I · ‖{ccrux}‖.
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Chapter 14
Epilogue
From previous discussion two structures of system safety emerge: the safety demonstration and indemnifica-
tion, its measure of assurance. Opinion follows.
14.1 Programmatic fit
Safety demonstration and indemnification merge smoothly into today’s programmatic picture. Early in the
development cycle, safety engineers provide “ballpark” quantifications of the threat of hazards[9], expressed
as intensity and severity. These numbers are often educated guesses: a mixture of circumstance, intuition,
similar design, and history. At that stage, the process is without supporting evidence. Later in the development
cycle, assuming a program of structured testing has been followed, statistical evidence is available in the
form of a safety demonstration. These data are expressed as a statistical upper bound on each software
hazard’s intensity – that is, an indemnification – and used as evidence of correct operation. This additional
configuration frees the safety engineer from having to re-asses his original estimate using the same shallow
method as the original guesstimate.
Increasingly, indigenous static syntax analyzers satisfy need for overall code robustness. However, exclusive
reliance on these analyzers would result in a software safety engineering shortcoming, because they do not
always detect code defects that have valid syntax (that is, syntactically valid but wrong algorithm).
14.2 Commercialization
Difficult work remains before safety demonstration and indemnification can be supported as mature commer-
cial technology. The role of the reactive actuated automaton must be replaced by a real-world programming
language. Present theory restricting tests (predecessor trajectories) to acyclic cones may require general-
ization to cyclic cones to achieve broader range. Safety demonstration demands the ability to produce ap-
proximate operational profiles from which can be drawn pseudo-random samples. Spin-offs from similar
technologies may be possible; static analyzers are one example.
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14.3 Criticism of MIL-STD-882
Statistical risk is a model emulating the threat of haphazard accidents. Users of MIL-STD-882 are familiar
with statistical risk as an accident model for hardware. Software is properly deterministic and therefore non-
stochastic, but it’s successfully approximated with the same Poisson stochastic process as hardware. The
rationale for this approximation is to apply a useful Poisson mathematical assurance property; thus assurance
depends on the validity of the Poisson process as an approximation to the reactive actuated automaton.
The Standard introduces a risk-like scale replacing statistical risk for software. For purpose of this chapter,
we call this replacement scale the design risk. The discussion of chapters 2 and 3 conclude that, from the
standpoint of statistical assurance, there is no justification for the presently differing versions of the term risk
between hardware and software.
The state of software engineering is mixed science and sophisticated art. In the current Standard, art has
somewhat overtaken science; for software, the concept of statistical risk has been abandoned. One subse-
quently loses the ability to measure and assure risk uniformly.
Design risk and statistical risk do share a severity axis, but the similarity ends there. Statistical risk has another
axis composed of a numerical product, the frequency of execution times the probability of error. What we
have called design risk also possesses another axis, but it is a categorical scale arranged in decreasing order
of the design safety importance of the software’s functionality.
This results in an error in MIL-STD-882 with serious consequence. Because the frequency of execution of
a software point is not well-correlated with its functionality’s design safety importance, statistical risk does
not correlate well with design risk. Because the Standard assigns statistical risk to hardware and design risk
to software, and due to lack of correlation between the two, there is no way to rank the relative importance
of hazards of mixed type. Loss of the ability to compare risks of all hazards is a flagrant omission. Under
correct physics, risks of multiple hazards are additive. This is not the case underMIL-STD-882.
The formal sense of assurance is lost by these definitional variants. Being quantitatively assured requires
a limit value on proportion or mean deviation and a statement of statistical confidence for this limit; the
Standard clearly lacks this characteristic. Properly assurance is a numeric quantity associated with statistical
control of risk, not an engineering activity to further psychological confidence. Despite that its developers
may express great confidence in the methodology, software built under the Standard is not quantitatively
assured.
14.4 Repair of MIL-STD-882
Rehabilitation ofMIL-STD-882 is straightforward. It must be amended to contain an engineering introduction
to statistical risk for software, including allied procedures. This subject matter is covered here in mathemat-
ical language, but should be presented differently for engineers’ consumption. The revised Standard should
distinguish between formal assurance and design confidence, and classify what procedures support either.
Generally, the concerns associated with design risk align with developmental software engineering, while
those of statistical risk align with responsibilities of system safety engineering, part of systems engineering.
Software and Systems Engineering should not duplicate each other’s efforts.
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Appendix A
Groundwork
This appendix examines ensembles, a mathematical structure in the theory of systems representing physical
stimulus and response. From this start, discussion proceeds into the Cartesian product, choice spaces and
subspaces, and partitions of choice spaces into deterministic and stochastic components. Dyadic notation is
introduced.
A.1 Ensemble
Using a single symbol, ensembles compactly represent physical stimuli, which are in turn associative map-
pings between entities and values. Here an entity is a unique descriptive category name such as “leftmost rear
light intensity control” and value is the setting of the light at a particular instant. One must be cautious to re-
alize engineering specificity in the naming of entities, as “leftmost rear light intensity control” is meaningless
when the light source has failed. A supplementary entity, for example “leftmost rear light failure status,” may
be necessary for engineering completeness. Physical systems are composed of interrelated combinations of
stimulus and response, in which response is completely determined by stimulus. An ensemble represents a
system stimulus at a particular instant of time.
Mathematically, an ensemble is a special form of a more general structure known as a family. We employ
nomenclature abridged from Halmos [7, p. 34] as follows:
Nomenclature. Let I and X be non-empty sets, and ϕ : I → X be a mapping. Each element i ∈ I is an
index, while I itself is an index set. The mapping ϕ is a family; its codomainX is an indexed set. An ordered
pair (i, x) belonging to the family is a term, whose value x = ϕ(i) ∈ X is often denoted ϕi.
Notation A.1.1. The family ϕ itself is routinely but abusively denoted {ϕn}. This notation is a compound
idiom.1 Especially in the case of sequences over a set G, the symbol {gn} signifies the mapping {1 7→
g1, 2 7→ g2, . . . }.
Definition A.1.2. An ensemble υ is a non-empty finite family (mapping).
Remark. Since physical systems possess only a finite number of attributes, the scope of interest is ensembles
having finite-dimensional index sets.
Notation A.1.3. Let ψ be an ensemble. For term (i, v) ∈ ψ, we denote v = ψi.
1 compound idiom: the symbol is a composite of other notational devices that do not together indicate the usual compound application
of the symbol’s separate sources; rather, the symbol has a meaning that must be recognized whole-wise.
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A.2 Ensemble relations and operations
This section presents binary comparisons and operators on ensembles.
Definition A.2.1. Two ensembles ψ and φ are disjoint if domψ ∩ domφ = ∅.
Definition A.2.2. Let ψ and θ be ensembles. The notation θ ⊆ ψ signifies that the restriction ψ↾dom θ = θ.
Theorem A.2.3. The ordinary set-theoretic union of two disjoint ensembles ψ and φ is another ensemble
ψ ∪ φ.
Proof. Definition A.1.2 asserts that ensembles ψ and φ are non-empty finite families, which are non-empty
mappings composed of a finite set of ordered pairs. The union of two finite sets of ordered pairs is another
finite set of ordered pairs. This union is a mapping because definition A.2.1 assures the domains have no
member in common. The mapping is an ensemble because it is non-empty and finite.
Remark. The mathematical question is posed by (index , value1) ∈ ψ and (index , value2) ∈ φ, so just what
unique (index , undefined) belongs to ψ ∪ φ? This represents a potential physical conflict of stimulus which
we wish to avoid categorically by requiring disjointness.
Definition A.2.4. Let ψ and θ be ensembles. The notation θ ⊆ ψ signifies that the restriction ψ↾dom θ = θ.
Definition A.2.5. Let ψ be an ensemble. The range of the ensemble is
ranψ =
⋃
i∈domψ
ψ(i).
A.2.1 Ensemble union and dyadic notation
Dyadic notation is useful in single frequently-used applicationswhich demand notational compactness. Dyadic
notation replaces a binary operator invocation by its two concatenated arguments, thus resembling a product:
operatorname(θ, φ) 7→ θφ.
Definition A.2.6. Let θ and φ be disjoint ensembles. By using dyadic product notation
θ ∪ φ = θφ,
disjointness (definition A.2.1) is implicitly implied.
Theorem A.2.7. Let θ and φ be disjoint ensembles; then θφ = φθ.
Proof. By twice applying definition A.2.6, θφ = θ ∪ φ and φθ = φ ∪ θ. But θ ∪ φ = φ ∪ θ, so θφ = φθ by
transitivity of equality.
A.3 Class
Definition A.3.1. A domain-uniform collection of ensembles is a set Υ such that for any υ1, υ2 ∈ Υ,
dom υ1 = dom υ2.
Definition A.3.2. (equivocation) The term class is a synonym for a domain-uniform set of ensembles.
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A.4 Class relations and operations
Definition A.4.1. Let Υ be a class. The idiom domΥ means domυ, where υ ∈ Υ.
Lemma A.4.2. Definition A.4.1 is unique.
Proof. Let Υ be a class and suppose υ1, υ2 ∈ Υ. Since Υ is a class, then it is also a domain-uniform set of
ensembles, and, by definition A.3.1, dom υ1 = dom υ2.
Remark. Although it has no proper domain, a class is a set of mappings which possesses a common domain.
Definition A.4.3. Let Υ be a class. If for index i ∈ domΥ there exists constant c0 such that υ(i) = c0 for
any ensemble υ ∈ Υ, then the class Υ is constant at i.
In the context of classes, the symbol usually designating “subset” instead indicates quasi-equality between
two classes:
Definition A.4.4. Let Ψ and Φ be classes. The notation Φ ⊆ Ψ means that for every ψ ∈ Ψ, there exists
φ ∈ Φ such that ψ↾domΦ= φ, and for every φ ∈ Φ, there exists ψ ∈ Ψ such that ψ↾domΦ= φ.
Definition A.4.5. Let Ψ be a class. The range of Ψ is the union the ranges of all constituent ensembles:
ranΨ =
⋃
ψ∈Ψ
ranψ.
A.4.1 Class union and dyadic notation
Definition A.4.6. Let Ψ and Υ be classes. The classes are disjoint if domΨ∩ domΥ = ∅ (using definition
A.4.1).
Recall from definition A.2.5 that the range of an ensemble ψ is ranψ = ∪i∈domψ ψ(i).
Definition A.4.7. The union of two disjoint classes Θ and Φ is
Θ ∪ Φ = {θφ : θ ∈ Θ, φ ∈ Φ}.
Definition A.4.8. Let Θ and Φ be disjoint classes. Disjointness (definition A.2.1) is implicitly implied by
using dyadic notation:
Θ ∪ Φ = ΘΦ.
A.4.2 Deterministic-stochastic partition of reactive stimulus
Definition 2.1.6 asserts that basis Φ̂× Ξ̂ is comprised of two disjoint classes. Indeed Φ, Ξ, andΨ = ΦΞ have
a central role in systems theory, and this importance will now be discussed.
In systems theory, Φ represents read-write or deterministic variables, and the class represents ensembles that
can be written. Its name is due to the fact that once it is written, its value persists until overwritten, possibly
many read operations later. The class Ξ represents stochastic variables, which are read-only. Thus there is a
physical reason for the disjointness of these two classes: memory is either read-write or read-only, and not
both.
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The class Ψ = ΦΞ represents the total reactive stimulus (that is, the total input which uniquely determines
the system’s output or response). The system’s response, on the other hand, must be recorded to read-write
variables, which is Φ in the case. The mathematical functionality which transforms stimulus into response
must have the functional prototype ΦΞ→ Φ.
A.5 Set product
Informally, a choice space contains all combinations of variables’ values, regardless of whether a particular
combination is realized in a listing. The Cartesian (set) product formalizes this notion.
A.5.1 Empirical range abstraction
In science and engineering, ranges are empirical and not truly limit quantities – they must be idealized to
admit the possibility of values which are omitted or skipped. A value’s absence from a particular data set does
not imply that the value is impossible; thus the entire data set must undergo an operation called abstraction.
For example, a collection of point set values may be abstracted as a bounded interval, whereas a categorical
range such as {off, on} is not affected. This is properly an engineering operation, so it may be represented
but not defined as a mathematical transformation.
We use the following pseudo-function to represent range abstraction:
ideal range = abstraction(empirical range).
A.5.2 Closure
(Future: simplify by re-introducing appendix A.5.3 ff. as a closure.)
A.5.3 Abstract hull
In science and engineering, some sets of stimuli are so numerous that they are not listable. A notation is
needed to admit the possibility of values which are omitted or skipped in a given list of observations.
An abstract hull is a finite subset whose total measure is T and contains no null subset.
A value’s absence from a particular data set does not imply that the value is impossible; thus the entire data set
must undergo an operation called abstraction. For example, a collection of point set values may be abstracted
as a bounded interval, whereas a categorical range such as {off, on} is not affected. This is properly an
engineering operation, so it may be represented but not defined as a mathematical transformation.
We use the following pseudo-function to represent range abstraction:
ideal range = abstraction(empirical range).
Empirical ranges will occur in the margins of a class:
Definition A.5.1. Let Ψ be a class with i ∈ domΨ. The marginal range of Ψ with respect to index i is
ranΨ(i) = {ψ(i) : ψ ∈ Ψ}.
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Theorem A.5.2. Let Ψ be a class. For each ψ ∈ Ψ and i ∈ domψ, ψ(i) ∈ abstraction(ranΨ(i)).
Proof. Abstraction includes some neighborhood of each observation.
We also assume that abstraction of the same phenomenon is invariant to the data set in which it occurs.
A.5.4 Cartesian product of empirical ranges
Definition A.5.3. Let Ψ be a class. For each i ∈ domΨ, set
Ψ♥(i) = abstraction(ranΨ(i)).
Definition A.5.4. Let Ψ be a class. The proto-set Ψ♥ is the union of the rationalized marginal ranges:
Ψ♥ =
⋃
i∈domΨ
Ψ♥(i).
Definition A.5.5. Let Ψ be a class with proto-set Ψ♥. The proto-space of Ψ is the set Ψ♥
domΨ, where
Ψ♥
domΨ is the set of all mappings domΨ→ Ψ♥.
Definition A.5.6. Let Ψ be a class with proto-set Ψ♥. Let χ : domΨ → Ψ♥ be a mapping. If χ satisfies
χ(i) ∈ Ψ♥(i) for each i ∈ domΨ, then χ is a choicemapping of Ψ.
Definition A.5.7. The set of all choice mappings of classΨ is the choice space (or general Cartesian product)∏
Ψ.
Remark. When restricted to classes and ensembles, the general Cartesian product may be approximated as
Ψ̂ = {ψ ∈ Ψ : {(i, v) : i ∈ domψ, v ∈ ranΨ(i)}}.
Nomenclature. Through the general Cartesian product, a class generates a choice space. For brevity we refer
to a point in a choice space (that is, a choice mapping) simply as a choice.
A.6 Relations in choice space
A.6.1 Proto-space
Theorem A.6.1. The proto-space Ψ♥
domΨ of class Ψ includes its choice space
∏
Ψ (that is,
∏
Ψ ⊆
Ψ♥
domΨ).
Proof. Suppose χ ∈
∏
Ψ. By definition A.5.6, χ is a mapping domΨ → Ψ♥. Then, by definition A.5.5,
χ ∈ Ψ♥
domΨ. Thus, any member of
∏
Ψ is also a member of Ψ♥
domΨ. From this we conclude
∏
Ψ ⊆
Ψ♥
domΨ.
A.6.2 Choice subspaces
Any mapping, including a choice mapping, may be restricted to subsets of its domain.
Definition A.6.2. Let Ψ be an class, and let R ⊆ domΨ be a subset of its index set. Suppose χ ∈
∏
Ψ is a
choice. A subchoice χ↾R is the ordinary mapping restriction of χ to its domain subset R.
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Remark. In the above, degenerate case R = ∅ yields χ↾R= ∅.
Definition A.6.3. Let Ψ be an class. For each R ⊆ domΨ, the subspace (
∏
Ψ)↾R is the set of subchoices
{ ν↾R : ν ∈
∏
Ψ }.
Theorem A.6.4. Let class Ψ generate choice space
∏
Ψ, and let R ⊆ domΨ be a subset of its index set.
The restriction of the choice space equals the choice space of the restriction:
(
∏
Ψ)↾R=
∏
(Ψ↾R ).
Proof. Suppose ξ ∈ (
∏
Ψ) ↾R . By definition A.6.2, there exists χ ∈
∏
Ψ such that ξ = χ ↾R . By
definition of Cartesian product, for each i ∈ domΨ, χ(i) ∈ Ψ(i). Since R ⊆ domΨ, then for each r ∈ R,
ξ(r) ∈ Ψ(r). Consider Ψ ↾R , for which dom (Ψ↾R ) = R. By definition of restriction, for r ∈ R, (Ψ ↾R
)(r) = Ψ(r). Since ξ(r) ∈ Ψ(r) and Ψ(r) = (Ψ↾R )(r), then for any r ∈ R, ξ(r) ∈ (Ψ↾R )(r) – that is, ξ is
a choice of Ψ↾R . From the preceding, ξ ∈ (
∏
Ψ)↾R implies ξ ∈
∏
(Ψ↾R ), or (
∏
Ψ)↾R⊆
∏
(Ψ↾R ).
Next suppose ξ ∈
∏
(Ψ ↾R ). Then, by definitions A.5.6 and A.5.7 covering Cartesian products, for each
r ∈ R, ξ(r) ∈ (Ψ ↾R )(r). The class Ψ coincides with its restriction Ψ ↾R on R. A restatement of this is
(Ψ↾R )(r) = Ψ(r) for r ∈ R. Substituting Ψ(r) for (Ψ↾R )(r) yields ξ(r) ∈ Ψ(r) for each r ∈ R. From
this it follows that ξ ∈ (
∏
Ψ)↾R , with the further implication that
∏
(Ψ↾R ) ⊆ (
∏
Ψ)↾R .
We conclude equality (
∏
Ψ)↾R=
∏
(Ψ↾R ) after establishing that each of these two sets is a subset of the
other.
Lemma A.6.5. Let Ψ and Φ be classes. If Φ̂ is a subspace of Ψ̂, then Φ ⊆ Ψ.
Proof. Let Φ̂ be a subspace of Ψ̂. By definition A.6.3, there exists R ⊆ domΨ such that Φ̂ = ( Ψ̂) ↾R .
By Theorem A.6.4, the restriction of the choice space equals the choice space of the restriction: (
∏
Ψ)↾R
=
∏
(Ψ ↾R ). Transitivity of equality implies Φ̂ =
∏
(Ψ ↾R ). Then, by Theorem ?? (invertibility of the
Cartesian product), Φ = Ψ↾R .
Suppose term (i, P ) ∈ Φ. Since Φ = Ψ↾R , then (i, P ) ∈ Ψ↾R . By the definition of restriction, this implies
both (i, P ) ∈ Ψ and i ∈ R. Since (i, P ) ∈ Φ implies (i, P ) ∈ Ψ, we conclude Φ ⊆ Ψ.
Lemma A.6.6. Let Ψ and Φ be classes. If Φ ⊆ Ψ and R = domΦ, then Φ = Ψ↾R .
Proof. Consider (i, P ) ∈ Ψ↾R . It then follows from the definition of restriction that (i, P ) ∈ Ψ and i ∈ R.
But R = domΦ, so i ∈ domΦ. This implies there exists (i, Q) ∈ Φ. Since Φ ⊆ Ψ, then (i, Q) ∈ Ψ. Since
Ψ is a mapping, then (i, P ) ∈ Ψ and (i, Q) ∈ Ψ implies P = Q. From P = Q and (i, Q) ∈ Φ, we infer that
(i, P ) ∈ Φ. Thus (i, P ) ∈ Ψ↾R implies (i, P ) ∈ Φ, so Ψ↾R⊆ Φ.
Next suppose (i, P ) ∈ Φ. From this it follows that i ∈ R = domΦ. From the premises (i, P ) ∈ Φ and
Φ ⊆ Ψ we conclude (i, P ) ∈ Ψ. Together (i, P ) ∈ Ψ and i ∈ R imply that (i, P ) ∈ Ψ↾R . Thus (i, P ) ∈ Φ
implies (i, P ) ∈ Ψ↾R , so Φ ⊆ Ψ↾R .
From Ψ↾R⊆ Φ and Φ ⊆ Ψ↾R we infer Φ = Ψ↾R .
Lemma A.6.7. Let Ψ and Φ be classes. If Φ ⊆ Ψ, then Φ̂ is a subspace of Ψ̂.
Proof. Set R = domΦ. Since Φ ⊆ Ψ by hypothesis, then by applying lemma A.6.6 we infer Φ = Ψ ↾R .
With this equality and Theorem ?? (invertibility of the Cartesian product), we have Φ̂ =
∏
(Ψ↾R ). Theorem
A.6.4 asserts that the restriction of the choice space equals the choice space of the restriction: (
∏
Ψ)↾R=∏
(Ψ ↾R ). Transitivity of equality implies Φ̂ = (
∏
Ψ) | R. This last equality is exactly the premise of
definition A.6.3: Φ̂ is a subspace of Ψ̂.
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Theorem A.6.8. Let Ψ and Φ be classes. Φ̂ is a subspace of Ψ̂ if and only if Φ ⊆ Ψ.
Proof. lemma A.6.5 asserts that if Φ̂ is a subspace of Ψ̂, then Φ ⊆ Ψ. Lemma A.6.7 asserts that if Φ ⊆ Ψ,
then Φ̂ is a subspace of Ψ̂. This pair of inverse implications establishes the biconditional.
Lemma A.6.9. If Υ, Ψ, and Φ are classes such that Υ = ΨΦ, then Ψ ⊆ Υ and Φ ⊆ Υ.
Proof. Since Υ is the dyadic product of Ψ and Φ, then by definition A.2.6, Ψ and Φ are disjoint classes and
Υ = Ψ ∪ Φ.
Suppose i ∈ domΥ = dom(Ψ ∪Φ). Through definition A.2.1, disjointness entails that domΨ ∩ domΦ =
∅. Thus, if i ∈ domΥ, exactly one of two cases hold: either A: i ∈ domΨ and i /∈ domΦ, or B: i ∈ domΦ
and i /∈ domΨ.
Assume case A, that i ∈ domΨ and i /∈ domΦ. With Υ = Ψ∪Φ, it follows from the definition of set union
that for any i ∈ domΨ, (i, P ) ∈ Ψ implies (i, P ) ∈ Υ – that is, Ψ ⊆ Υ.
For case B, similar argument leads to Φ ⊆ Υ.
Corollary A.6.10. If Υ, Ψ, and Φ are classes such that Υ = ΨΦ, then Ψ(i) = Υ(i) for i ∈ domΨ, and
Φ(j) = Υ(j) for j ∈ domΦ.
Proof. Under identical premises, lemma A.6.9 provides Ψ ⊆ Υ and Φ ⊆ Υ. Suppose i ∈ domΨ. If
(i, P ) ∈ Ψ, then (i, P ) ∈ Υ since Ψ ⊆ Υ. The notation Ψ(i) = Υ(i) (both equaling P ) is equivalent. A
similar argument demonstrates Φ(j) = Υ(j) for j ∈ domΦ.
Theorem A.6.11. Let Υ,Ψ, and Φ be classes such thatΥ = ΨΦ. For each υ ∈ Υ̂, there exist unique ψ ∈ Ψ̂
and φ ∈ Ψ̂ such that υ = ψφ.
Proof. Suppose υ ∈ Υ̂. Since any choice has the same domain as its generating ensemble, domΥ = domυ.
Theorem ?? states that domΥ = domΨ ∪ domΦ, from which transitivity of equality provides dom υ =
domΨ ∪ domΦ.
From lemma A.6.9 we conclude Ψ ⊆ Υ and Φ ⊆ Υ. Since these relations hold for entire classes, then
the same is true of the ensembles’ domains: domΨ ⊆ domΥ and domΦ ⊆ domΥ. By substitution, the
previous result domΥ = domυ then establishes that domΨ ⊆ dom υ and domΦ ⊆ domυ.
The inclusion domΨ ⊆ dom υ ensures that the restriction ψ = υ ↾domΨ is well-defined. Similarly φ =
υ↾domΦ is also well-defined.
We next focus on the restriction ψ constructed above, seeking to demonstrate that it is also a member of the
choice space Ψ̂. Suppose term (i, p) ∈ ψ. Since ψ = υ↾domΨ , then both (i, p) ∈ υ and i ∈ domΨ. Since
υ ∈ Υ̂ by hypothesis, definition A.5.6 demands that p ∈ Υ(i) whenever (i, p) ∈ υ. Corollary A.6.10 asserts
Ψ(i) = Υ(i) for i ∈ domΨ. Since p ∈ Υ(i) and Υ(i) = Ψ(i) then p ∈ Ψ(i). Thus for any (i, p) ∈ ψ, it
follows that p ∈ Ψ(i). This means that ψ is a choice of Ψ by definition A.5.6 – that is, ψ ∈ Ψ̂ by definition
A.5.7.
Similar reasoning establishes that the other restriction φ is a member of Φ̂. The unique ψ ∈ Ψ̂ and φ ∈ Ψ̂
such that υ = ψφ are expressed by the restrictions ψ = υ↾domΨ and φ = υ↾domΦ .
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Appendix B
Invalid logic in MIL-STD-882
A secondary goal is resolving the conflict over the definition of the term risk. The first meaning is an accident
model known in mathematics as the compound Poisson stochastic process, and is called statistical risk. It
is composed of an (intensity, severity) pair, and underlies the theory of safety and availability engineering.
Reliability considers only the dimension of intensity. The second is here called developmental risk, and
considers a sequence of five categories of decreasing software autonomy, which allow decreasing amounts of
time for manual recovery of control.
A secondary topic is distinguishing two separate subjects which have become confused in MIL-STD-882E:
there are two different technical meanings for the term risk. This lack of clarity involves an engineered
product assurance method and an engineering process assurance method for software development.
The first meaning is known in mathematics as the compound Poisson stochastic process, and is called statis-
tical risk. It is composed of an (intensity, severity) pair, and underlies the theory of safety and availability
engineering. Reliability considers only the dimension of intensity. The second is here called developmental
risk, and considers a sequence of five categories of decreasing software autonomy, which allow decreasing
amounts of time for manual recovery of control.
A primary objective of safety engineering is consistent quantitative risk assessment. Consistency was en-
forced through a common risk model known in mathematics as the compound Poisson stochastic process.
A primary objective of safety engineering is consistent quantitative (or as an approximation, categorical) risk
assessment. Consistency was enforced through a common risk model known in mathematics as the compound
Poisson stochastic process.
Such units characterize military standard safety and reliability measurements, particularlyMIL-STD-882E (the
United States Department of Defense standard for system safety engineering).
A second incentive for this memoir is correcting an error inMIL-STD-882E. This consistency was recently lost
to a new empirical method for software risk management. In the current Standard, hardware risk management
is conducted via the compound Poisson process, while software is assigned the empirical method. Compar-
ison of these methods reveals potentially noxious divergence. This conclusion is inescapable because the
empirical method is not algebraically reducible to a compound Poisson process, and fails to be a measure of
risk according to dimensional analysis. At most one of these methods can be correct. The empirical method
is presently pseudo-science. To gain status as proper science. its scope must be examined for relevance to
elementary engineering principles, NOT risk assessment.
A second incentive for this memoir is correction of an inconsistency in MIL-STD-882E. This inconsistency
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involves a regimin that begins with a general product assurance method and concludes confounded with a
process assurance method for software development. This confusion’s enabling mechanism is two different
technical meanings for the term risk. The first meaning is known in mathematics as the compound Poisson
stochastic process, and will be called statistical risk. For lack of a better term, the second is called develop-
mental risk. In development risk, there is but one universal hazard: Loss of computer control. It is mitigated
by the the duration required for a human operator to recognize and manually recover from loss of computer
control.
Computers may control safety-critical operations in machines having embedded software. This memoir pro-
poses a regimen to verify such algorithms at precribed levels of statistical confidence.
Discussion appears in two major parts: theory, which shows the relationship between automata, discrete
systems, and software; and application, which covers demonstration and indemnification. Demonstration is
a method for generating random tests and indemnification is a technique for representing pass/fail test results
as compound Poisson measure (severity and intensity).
A second incentive for this memoir is correction of an inconsistency in MIL-STD-882E. This inconsistency
involves a regimin that begins with a general product assurance method and concludes confounded with a
process assurance method for software development. This confusion’s enabling mechanism is two different
meanings for the technical term risk. The first meaning is known in mathematics as the compound Poisson
stochastic process, and will be called statistical risk. The second is called developmental risk.
A primary objective of safety engineering is consistent quantitative risk assessment. Consistency was en-
forced through a common risk model known in mathematics as the compound Poisson stochastic process.
A primary objective of safety engineering is consistent quantitative (or as an approximation, categorical) risk
assessment. Consistency was enforced through a common risk model known in mathematics as the compound
Poisson stochastic process.
Such units characterize of military standard safety and reliability measurements, particularly MIL-STD-882E
(the United States Department of Defense standard for system safety engineering).
A second incentive for this memoir is correcting an error inMIL-STD-882E. This consistency was recently lost
to a new empirical method for software risk management. In the current Standard, hardware risk management
is conducted via the compound Poisson process, while software is assigned the empirical method. Compar-
ison of these methods reveals potentially noxious divergence. This conclusion is inescapable because the
empirical method is not algebraically reducible to a compound Poisson process, and fails to be a measure of
risk according to dimensional analysis. At most one of these methods can be correct. The empirical method
is presently pseudo-science. To gain status as proper science. its scope must be examined for relevance to
elementary engineering principles, NOT risk assessment.
A second incentive for this memoir is correction of an inconsistency in MIL-STD-882E. This inconsistency
involves a regimin that begins with a general product assurance method and concludes confounded with a
process assurance method for software development. This confusion’s enabling mechanism is two different
technical meanings for the term risk. The first meaning is known in mathematics as the compound Poisson
stochastic process, and will be called statistical risk. The second is called developmental risk for lack of a
better term.
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Appendix C
MIL-STD-882 and the categorical CPP
MIL-STD-882 is the United States Department of Defense Standard Practice for System Safety. Revision E
became effective May 11, 2012. In preference to accident, this standard prefers the term mishap, which it
defines as “an event or series of events resulting in unintentional death, injury, occupational illness, damage
to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment.”
Its safety risk assessment method uses the compound Poisson process (CPP) to represent the timing and
severity of mishaps. MIL-STD-882E partitions compound Poisson processes into a lattice of categories and
levels that covers the range of interest. The category is a variable which, in an explicit range [1-4], expresses
the expectation (µL) of the CPP loss random variable L. The level is a variable which, in an explicit range
[A-F], expresses the rate or intensity λ of the CPP.
The system of categories and levels agrees with the limits of discernibility of human intuition. Two different
compound Poisson processes having the same category and level are indeed different but in practice are
indistinguishable. This characteristic imposes a logarithmic organization on the categories and levels.
Description Severity Mishap Result Criteria
Category
Catastrophic 1 Could result in one or more of the following: death, permanent total
disability, irreversible significant environmental impact, or monetary loss
equal to or exceeding $10M.
Critical 2 Could result in one or more of the following: permanent partial disabil-
ity, injuries or occupational illness that may result in hospitalization of
at least three personnel, reversible significant environmental impact, or
monetary loss equal to or exceeding $1M but less than $10M.
Marginal 3 Could result in one or more of the following: injury or occupational
illness resulting in one or more lost work day(s), reversible moderate
environmental impact, or monetary loss equal to or exceeding $100K but
less than $1M.
Negligible 4 Could result in one or more of the following: injury or occupational
illness not resulting in a lost work day, minimal environmental impact,
or monetary loss less than $100K.
Table C.1: MIL-STD-882E Severity Categories
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Description Level Specific Individual Item Fleet or Inventory
Frequent A Likely to occur often in the life of an
item.
Continuously experienced.
Probable B Likely to occur often in the life of an
item.
Will occur frequently.
Occasional C Likely to occur sometime in the life
of an item.
Will occur several times.
Remote D Unlikely, but possible to occur in the
life of an item.
Unlikely, but can reasonably be ex-
pected to occur.
Improbable E So unlikely, it can be assumed oc-
currence may not be experienced in
the life of an item.
Unlikely to occur, but possible.
Eliminated F Incapable of occurrence. This level is used when potential hazards are
identified and later eliminated.
Table C.2: MIL-STD-882E Probability Levels
Table 2 above is a qualitative description of levels. Table 3 below, appearing in MIL-STD-882E Appendix A,
outlines certain pitfalls in accomplishing the same task quantitatively. Numerical expression of the intensity
or rate of occurrence is generally preferable to mere qualitative phrasing. For quantitative description, the
intensity is the ratio of mishaps (numerator) to some measure of exposure (denominator).
Description Level Individual Item Fleet/Inventory* Quantitative
Frequent A Likely to occur often in the
life of an item
Continuously experienced. Probability of occurrence
greater than or equal to
10−1.
Probable B Will occur several times in
the life of an item
Will occur frequently. Probability of occurrence
less than 10−1 but greater
than or equal to 10−2.
Occasional C Likely to occur sometime
in the life of an item
Will occur several times. Probability of occurrence
less than 10−2 but greater
than or equal to 10−3.
Remote D Unlikely, but possible to
occur in the life of an item
Unlikely but can reason-
ably be expected to occur.
Probability of occurrence
less than 10−3 but greater
than or equal to 10−6.
Improbable E So unlikely, it can be as-
sumed occurrence may not
be experienced in the life
of an item
Unlikely to occur, but pos-
sible.
Probability of occurrence
less than 10−6.
Eliminated F Incapable of occurrence within the life of an item. This category is used when
potential hazards are identified and later eliminated.
Table C.3: MIL-STD-882E Example Probability Levels
* The size of the fleet or inventory should be defined
The false hegemony of a single intuitively understood measure of exposure will now be examined. We will
find that, however well-intended, Table 3 lacks essential explanation. Without that, it is an oversimplification.
“Natural” measures of exposure must embrace a variety of units, some examples of which are: the life of
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one item, number of missile firings, flight hours, miles driven, or years of service. For example, an exposure
measure of miles driven is expected silently to exclude substantial periods when the system is out of use.
Similar would be any situation-based measure of exposure having a sizable portion of time spent in unused
status (time not counted). This topic appeared in §13.2.2, the intermittant compound Poisson process. The
natural unit of exposure can be tuned to the culture of a particular hazard. However, lacking conversion
capability, this freedom of choice leads to the problem of a system composed of a heterogeneous plethora of
non-comparable exposure units.
What is behind this incomparability? Natural units are important but incomplete – MIL-STD-882E needs
additional factors to paint a full quantitative picture. There is need for conversion of various natural units
into a single common standard unit, so that comparison involves only observation of magnitudes, without
pondering the meaning of different units. This is particularly important in the cases of many ambiguous
references to “life.” Suppose we arbitrarily standardize time duration at one year. We then define a conversion
factor p, which means that p years constitute a life. A measure ι quantifies what fraction of time the system’s
mission is inactive or idle. A conversion factor for remaining units must be established; without specifying
what units remain to be converted, we can say that the unit conversion calculus of elementary physics results
in some linear coefficient κ. With N a natural exposure unit and U a standard measure, what we have stated
so far is summarized in the following form:
U =
κ · (1− ι)
p
·N.
Standard units measure statistical risk as resulting from exposure to an intermittent compound Poisson pro-
cess. These standard units may not be a proper exposure, but measure the exposure expected in a year’s
duration. For this reason we celebrate the importance of the role of pure natural units; it is important to
understand risk as proportionate to exposure. To understand this importance, imagine yourself as the one
exposed to a transient but intense hazard. But that does not imply the dismissal of statistical risk as a concern;
it is also part of the risk analysis picture to consider how much risk exposure occurs within a given duration.
This is the role of the standard unit.
Another complicating factor is the use of the term “level” itself. A level is a designator for a class of possibly
intermittent indistinguishable probability distributions. Rather than being clear about this, MIL-STD-882E
equivocates greatly in Table 3, confusing this designator with a literal probability statement. Only after
full quantitative analysis is completed (p, ι, and κ known) can definite statements concerning probability be
asserted. It is insufficient to mandate vague documentation of “all numerical definitions of probability used
in risk assessments” without further guidance.
Table 4 below is a categorical rendering of the hyperbola of statistical risk. Definition 13.2.3 asserts h = λµL.
Excepting the administrative level “Eliminated”, this cross-tabulation presents the level (λ) on the vertical
axis and the category (µL) along the horizontal axis. For each combination of level and category, another
categorical variable1 represents the statistical risk h = λµL with values: High, Serious, Medium, and Low.
This table suffers the same ambiguity as in Table 3. MIL-STD-882’s definitions are clearly inadequate for
quantitative analysis. Through equivocation, exposure to an intermittent compound Poisson process is re-
garded as not different than exposure to a compound Poisson process, despite that the difference becomes
obvious through the linear factor (1− ι). MIL-STD-882 is an evolving document in its fifth major revision; let
us hope these ambiguities are resolved in the future.
1Not to be confused with the categorical variable named “category”
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SEVERITY / Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible
PROBABILITY (1) (2) (3) (4)
Frequent (A) High High Serious Medium
Probable (B) High High Serious Medium
Occasional (C) High Serious Medium Low
Remote (D) Serious Medium Medium Low
Improbable (E) Medium Medium Medium Low
Eliminated (F) Eliminated
Table C.4: MIL-STD-882E Risk Assessment Matrix
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Appendix D
Deterministic finite automaton
While neither the deterministic finite automaton nor the reactive actuated automaton are proper subsets of
each other, they do have similarities.
D.1 Definition of DFA
This simple depiction of the deterministic finite automaton appears in Wikipedia [10]:
A [deterministic finite] automaton is represented formally by the 5-tuple 〈Q,Σ, δ, q0, A〉, where:
• Q is a finite set of states.
• Σ is a finite set of symbols, called the alphabet of the automaton.
• δ is the transition function, that is, δ : Q× Σ→ Q.
• q0 is the start state, that is, the state which the automaton occupieswhen no input has been
processed yet, where q0 ∈ Q.
• A is a set of states of Q (i.e. A ⊆ Q) called accept states.
An approach for engineers is found in [6].
D.2 Analogous structures
The following structures are analogous between the DFA and RAA:
Analogy DFA RAA
State/Locus Q Λ
Alphabet/Reactive Stimulus Σ Ψ̂
Transition Function/Actuation δ : Q× Σ→ Q λi+1 = ord ((ai ◦⊞dom ai)(ψi))
Table D.1: DFA/RAA Analogies
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D.3 Actuation vs. transition function
The reactive actuated automaton uses actuators to determine the next locus, while the deterministic finite
automaton uses the transition function for the same purpose. In the DFA, if q ∈ Q is the current state and
σ ∈ Σ is the current symbol, then the next state is q′ = δ(q, σ). For the RAA, assuming λ ∈ Λ is the current
locus and ψ ∈ Ψ is the current reactive stimulus, then the next locus is λ′ = ord ((ai ◦⊞dom ai)(ψi)).
The RAA is somewhat more restrictive because both its next locus and its actuated functionality must remain
constant over the blocks of partition#λ(Ψ̂).
Remark. This means that the actuated functionality f is the same across partition block B. It does not that
the application f (ψ) is constant over ψ ∈ B.
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Appendix E
Locus digraph
With any reactive actuated automaton is associated a directed graph called the locus digraph, also known as
the software control flow graph. This digraph is made famous by Thomas McCabe, who uses it in his study
of program (cyclomatic) complexity[11].
E.1 Vertex
Definition E.1.1. Let A be a reactive actuated automaton. In the locus digraph induced by A, a vertex is an
element of the automaton’s catalog of loci Λ.
E.2 Edge
Definition E.2.1. In the locus digraph induced by automaton A, a vertex λ is directionally connected to
another vertex λ′ if there exists configuration c such that λ = ℧Λ(c) and λ
′ = ℧Λ(A(c)).
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